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In this paper we quantify the differences between market and regulatory assessments of bank 
portfolio risk, and thereby demonstrate that larger differences significantly reduce corporate 
lending rates. Specifically, to entice borrowers, banks reduce spreads by approximately 4.3% 
following a one standard deviation increase in our measure for bank asset-risk differences. This 
is equivalent to an interest income loss of USD 2.03 million on a loan of average size and 
duration. The separate effects of market and regulatory risk are much less potent. Our study 
reveals a disciplinary-competition effect in favor of corporate borrowers when there is 
information asymmetry between investors and bank regulators. 
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Financial markets and bank regulators monitor the solvency of banks, disclose information, 
and discipline misconduct in an effort to enhance banking and financial stability. Despite 
markets and regulators being the two most important banking disciplinary mechanisms, their 
assessments on bank (solvency) risk levels may diverge significantly, implying a significant 
source of asymmetric information (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013). This type of asymmetric 
information, and the resulting differences in risk perceptions, creates uncertainty for the players 
that participate in bank lending, especially in the case of large systemic banks where the size 
of loans may be substantial. The aforementioned raises a number of pertinent questions: is this 
uncertainty systematically priced or accounted for in bank loan contracting, and does it affect 
the sustainability of bank-firm relationships? This paper seeks to answer these questions by 
focusing on large corporate loan deals made in syndicated loan markets around the world. 
 Markets use all available information (including that disclosed by bank regulators) to 
form perceptions of overall bank risk. Regulators, on the other hand, focus on accounting-based 
measures and other operational reports obtained directly from the banks under their supervision 
to establish bank supervisory ratings, and also use auditing and market-based measures, which 
they do so more and more frequently. Where low information asymmetry prevails, markets and 
regulators should, in principle, agree in their evaluations of healthy and transparent banks. 
Conversely, relatively high levels of information asymmetry, whether due to forces 
endogenous or exogenous to bank operations, may give rise to strong disagreement between 
markets and regulators. This would seem to imply a higher degree of uncertainty regarding the 
financial health of a bank. 
The syndicated loan market is an excellent laboratory for any examination of the 
potential effects of different risk perceptions of market and regulators on bank lending 
behavior. Where differential perceptions of bank risk exist, the syndicate’s lead bank (the one 
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making the important decisions regarding lending, including finding borrowers and participant 
lenders and setting the lending terms) might need to exert additional effort to “convince” 
corporate borrowers and participant lenders to actively engage. This holds true, especially 
when the assessments of the market on its risk level is higher than that of the regulator. We 
hypothesize that the additional effort required results in an observable outcome for the banks 
under scrutiny, i.e., banks offers more competitive (lower) loan spreads to assure the borrowing 
firm(s) its interests are being served. 
 To test this hypothesis, we first calculate the difference between the market and 
regulatory estimates of bank portfolio risk, hereinafter referred to as “portfolio risk 
differences.” For market risk we use the volatility of bank asset returns derived from option 
pricing theory (e.g., Ronn and Verma, 1986; Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Vallascas and 
Hagendorff, 2013). For regulatory risk we use the risk-based capital ratio, which bank 
regulators most often examine because it reflects a bank’s portfolio risk vis-à-vis the capital 
available to support the bank’s risk-related choices. This ratio is jointly determined by the bank 
and its supervisors and is subject to supervisory approval even in cases where the bank’s 
economic capital exceeds regulatory capital requirements (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2017). Subsequently, we estimate the differences in portfolio risk between the 
two measures from the residuals of their bivariate regression, and use these residuals to explain 
lending terms, namely the loan spread over LIBOR to assess the direct effects on firm financing 
costs.  
Our dataset includes more than 40,000 syndicated loan deals from 2002–2016. In 
addition to the theoretical advantage of using syndicated loans to test our central hypotheses, 
there are at least two practical advantages. First, most of the banks participating in this market 
are listed, allowing for the market-based measure of portfolio risk. Second, the loan-level data 
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allow the use of several layers of information, for banks, firms, and loans in our tests, making 
it easier to identify causal effects. 
 We recognize that the uncertainty resulting from the divergence between the market-
based and regulatory estimates of portfolio risk is just one of many sources of information 
asymmetry that shapes bank-lending decisions. An additional source includes asymmetric 
information arising from a bank’s overall or idiosyncratic exposure to firm credit risk, which 
is usually evident in the formation of a syndicate and the loan share of its lead bank (Sufi, 2007; 
Ivashina, 2009). Since our aim is to identify a causal effect between portfolio risk differences 
and bank loan terms, proper identification rests on correctly addressing this alternative source 
of information asymmetry. 
We achieve this using several tests. Importantly, the loan-level data and the observation 
of repeated lending to the same firm within a given year allow using firm times year fixed 
effects. The latter control for any alternative time-varying demand (firm) side explanations for 
our findings. We also control for certain loan characteristics, including the number of lenders 
in a syndicate, the number of participant banks, and the syndicate’s concentration, all of which 
capture information asymmetry within the syndicate (see Sufi, 2007). In even more stringent 
specifications, we control for general evolving economic conditions alongside other conditions 
in the countries of both lenders and borrower. We do this via lender’s and borrower’s country 
times year fixed effects, as well as quarter effects to control for common global effects on all 
banks and firms. We conduct several additional tests, including the use of Heckman-type 
models to account for selection issues between banks and firms, and use of alternative measures 
of portfolio risk differences. 
We find that, ceteris paribus, loan spreads on drawn funds decrease by an economically 
significant 4.3%, or 11.6 basis points, in response to a one standard deviation increase in our 
measure of portfolio risk differences (market risk above regulation risk). This amounts to 
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approximately USD 0.41 million less in annual interest income for a loan of average size, 
increasing to USD 2.03 million over the loan’s duration for a loan of average size and duration. 
Given that each lead bank in our sample extends approximately 26 loans per year while 
retaining a 24% loan share, the mean annual foregone interest rises significantly to USD 2.57 
million. 
Notably, we find that the negative effect of these risk differences is mainly concentrated 
in banks perceived by the markets to be riskier, while banks perceived to be riskier by the 
regulators do not experience a significant effect on their loan spreads. We attribute this to the 
sharper increases in market assessment (compared to regulatory assessment), the inattention of 
lending participants to regulatory risk assessment when bad news hits the markets, and the 
unenforceability of market risk assessment (as opposed to the enforceability of regulatory 
assessment that must yield a decrease in risk-weighted assets/increase in capital). The key 
finding of our paper highlights the operative and disciplinary role of market forces in banking 
supervision, which materialize when there are conflicting bank risk estimates between 
investors and supervisors. Put simply, we demonstrate that the difference between risk 
perceptions is that which has the greatest effect, and not the two perceptions separately. 
We further enhance our identification approach for a supply-side effect of portfolio risk 
differences by investigating bank heterogeneity with respect to financial health. We thus 
hypothesize that the negative effect of portfolio risk differences should be less potent for more 
financially sound banks. We examine this hypothesis using models with interaction terms 
between our measure of portfolio risk differences and measures of banks’ financial health. 
Besides highlighting relevant heterogeneity in the results, these models further enhance our 
identification of a supply-side mechanism driving our findings (e.g., Jiménez, Ongena, Peydro, 
and Saurina, 2014). Indeed, we find this to be the case for more profitable banks, with better 
credit ratings, and lower levels of non-performing loans. We also show a more muted role for 
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portfolio risk differences in explaining loan spreads when there is a recently established bank–
firm relationship.   
Our analysis ultimately traces the implications of the market-regulatory information 
asymmetry for the sustainability of bank-firm relationships. We note that higher relevant 
informational asymmetries might increase the probability of ending a lending relationship. This 
is costly to banks but also costly to borrowing firms, who must then initiate a new lending 
relationship with another bank. However, if this is an option to the borrowers and banks are 
unable to reduce spreads, we should also observe an increase in the probability of ending 
lending relationships. We show that this is indeed also the case. On the same front, we find that 
the probability of ending a relationship is higher for loans of shorter maturities and higher 
upfront fees. Similarly, relationships are more likely to end for highly valued and profitable 
firms.  
Previous literature also measures information asymmetry using disagreement between 
rating agencies (e.g., Morgan, 2002) or between regulators and markets (e.g., Vallascas and 
Hagendorff, 2013). This literature establishes that agency disagreement in evaluating risk is a 
valuable measure of information asymmetry and shows that regulatory estimates of bank 
portfolio risk are inconsistent with market-based estimates. Several other studies recognize the 
shortcomings of the Basel framework to accurately reflect the degree of risk attached to bank 
portfolios (Kim and Santomero, 1988; Avery and Berger, 1991; Jones, 2000; Hellwig, 2010). 
This literature has different objectives, as it does not look at the supply-side loan pricing 
decisions of banks as a function of disagreement and associated information asymmetry 
between different external stakeholders (in our context, market participants and regulators). 
In particular, our study relates to two additional strands of literature. Early evidence by 
Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002) shows that low-capital banks charge higher loan rates. More 
recent studies indicate that well-capitalized banks typically supply more expensive loans 
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(Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and Marquez, 2014; Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and Suarez, 2017), especially 
those with higher liquidity risk (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012). Santos (2011) shows that higher 
credit risk following the eruption of the subprime crisis in 2008 obliged the banks to increase 
loan spreads to the same firm. Moreover, our paper relates to the literature on asymmetric 
information in the syndicated loans market. Sufi (2007) shows that information asymmetry 
between lenders and borrowers increases the share of the lead arrangers in order to improve 
monitoring intensity. Ivashina (2009) shows that information asymmetry between members of 
the loan syndicate yields larger loan shares by lead banks and lower loan spreads.    
By anchoring bank capital and/or risk-weighted assets (the predominant regulatory-
based perception of bank risk) to market-based estimates of bank risk (as in Vallascas and 
Hagendorff, 2013), we assert that portfolio risk differences carry greater weight in the bank’s 
loan pricing decision compared to the level terms of risk-weighted assets or market risk. Our 
study is the first to uncover this important supply-side effect on loan pricing. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the conceptual framework 
and places our study within the existing literature. We develop two testable hypotheses on the 
effect of portfolio risk differences on loan spreads and how this effect can be heterogeneous 
with respect to lead banks’ financial characteristics and relationship lending. Section 3 presents 
our dataset and discusses our identification strategy. Sections 4 to 6 report and discuss the 
empirical results. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses Development 
Our basic premise is that portfolio risk differences reflect asymmetric information between the 
two key players identifying bank portfolio risk, namely markets and regulators. Markets use 
all available information to infer bank portfolio risk and the outcome of this information yields 
asset volatility as the key market-based measure of risk. In turn, regulators focus on measures 
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of risk-weighted assets (inclusive or not of capital), as reflected on a bank’s balance sheet (book 
value of asset risk), supervise banks concerning this risk, and ultimately adopt the book values 
or ask for revisions via informal and formal enforcement actions remaining bound to these 
measures (e.g., Acharya, Engle, and Pierret, 2014; Flannery, 2014). However, a loss of equity 
market value is not necessarily reflected in book equity measures, which impedes the 
supervisors’ ability to require a bank to augment its capital due to a significant loss. Given this, 
the supervisory metric for judging sufficient capital is disassociated from that of the market 
(Flannery, 2014).  
We contend that our measure captures a general form of information asymmetry. The 
idea backing our measure is simple: if bank portfolio risk is harder to observe and measure, 
markets and regulators (supervising the accounting-based measure) should disagree more often 
about the true level of bank portfolio risk. Such disagreement can ultimately affect the way a 
bank organizes its lending arrangements (i.e., the supply-side lending decisions of banks). An 
increase in asymmetric information regarding the true level of banks’ portfolio risk creates a 
reputational disadvantage, thereby increasing pressure on the banks to make sound lending 
choices. 
We expect this effect to be particularly potent when market-based estimates of bank 
portfolio risk exceed the regulatory estimates. Firstly, this can be explained partly by the fact 
that markets react more quickly to negative developments causing sharp increases in their 
valuation of risky assets, and a positive difference between market and regulatory assessment 
of bank portfolio risk. In contrast, there is some delay in regulatory supervision and assessment 
to take effect because of limited resources and the related difficulty in onsite supervision of 
banks, as well as a lengthy supervision process when excessive risks are identified. Besides, 
regulators tend to be conservative in their risk assessment (asking banks to hold an increasing 
volume of lower risk-weighted assets in the balance sheets), so that a negative value on the 
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difference between market and regulatory risk might be the norm, making the lending 
participants (borrowers and banks) inattentive. Secondly markets exert only a disciplining 
effect on riskier banks, although as opposed to the regulators they do not enforce this effect. 
Given that banks are not obliged to lower asset risk in order to ease market concerns, they can 
further increase the true risk evidenced in their portfolios and can be more severely affected 
during unexpected shocks (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013; Acharya, Engle, and Pierret, 
2014), causing sharp increases in portfolio risk differences. 
Unexpected (negative) developments regarding perceptions of a bank’s asset risk 
increase asymmetric information, and consequently may raise market concerns about the 
bank’s ability to conduct business. Banks that experience widening risk perceptions are likely 
to succumb to borrower demands in their attempt to ease concerns regarding solvency when 
negotiating the syndication of a new loan. This additional effort might take the form of 
competitive loan terms, primarily reflected in lower loan spreads and secondarily in non-price 
terms such as reduced collateral requirements, higher loan amounts, or longer maturities. 
Simple measures of bank portfolio risk or opacity cannot capture the effect of this type of 
disagreement and corresponding information asymmetry on the lending terms (e.g., Morgan, 
2002). This leads us to propose our first hypothesis (Hypothesis 1): 
 
H1: When market perceptions of lead banks’ portfolio risk exceed regulatory risk 
assessments, loan syndicates will offer cheaper loans to corporate borrowers.  
 
Further, when market risk perceptions exceed regulatory risk assessments, we expect 
the downward adjustment of loan spreads to be contingent on the characteristics of the lending 
bank. Hence, for large, profitable lenders with limited exposure to non-performing loans the 
adjustment should be less sizeable ‒ or even reversed. Large institutions have distinct structural 
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characteristics and corporate governance schemes compared to small institutions, which often 
means that they process the same economic news and developments differently (Chan and 
Chen, 1991). In addition, large, sophisticated lenders might have more efficient credit risk 
departments for monitoring overall credit risk exposure and counterparty risk, rendering these 
banks less susceptible than smaller, less sophisticated lenders to adverse information stemming 
from market-based estimates. 
The existence of a prior lending relationship between the lead bank and the borrowing 
firm further emerges as an additional mechanism for minimizing uncertainty regarding a bank’s 
ability to serve a loan. Typically, these relationships convey information to banks that firms 
are unable to communicate to the capital markets with any credibility. Notwithstanding, they 
also work in the opposite direction, as firms can obtain valuable information from banks in 
excess of that available to the markets (Kang and Stulz, 2000; Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan, 2009). Either party can capitalize on this relationship in bad times, with banks in 
particular able to increase their bargaining power during the loan negotiation process, which 
limits the effects of increased portfolio risk differences (Bolton, Freixas, Gambacorta, and 
Mistrulli, 2016). 
Where the above mechanisms pertain, we expect to observe a reversal in the sign on 
portfolio risk differences for loans granted by well-managed lenders with a prior relationship 
with the borrower compared to poorly managed first-time lenders. This leads to our second 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 2): 
 
H2: The pressure to reduce loan spreads when market portfolio risk perceptions exceed 
regulatory risk assessments is ameliorated for well-performing lenders with a prior banking 




3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
Syndicated loans from DealScan provide us with information on the loan pricing of those banks 
with actively traded stocks and, by extension, measurable market-based portfolio risk. We 
consider only loans with information on loan spreads, which eliminates all types of Islamic 
finance and very specialized credit lines. Our dataset covers the 2002–2016 period and the 
number of loan facilities in our baseline specifications ranges from 42,857 to 52,038 in total, 
depending on the control variables used. These 42,857 loans are drawn from 364 lead banks 
headquartered in 41 countries and granted to 10,230 borrowers operating in 102 countries. 
We match the loans with bank- and firm-specific information, although in most of our 
analyses we use firm × year fixed effects that render firm-year characteristics redundant. In a 
third round of data collection we match the resulting dataset with macroeconomic and 
institutional (country-year) variables from several freely available sources. Again, the 
specifications using lender’s country × year fixed effects and borrower’s country × year fixed 
effects render the effects of country-year characteristics redundant. We provide variable 
definitions and sources in Table 1 and basic summary statistics in Table 2.  
Further, in Table A1 we report the number of loans and the mean and standard deviation 
of Portfolio risk differences by lender country. In loans granted by U.S. lenders, which 
represent about half of our sample, Portfolio risk differences ranges from -0.31 to 0.09. The 
phenomenon is even more pronounced in the Eurozone countries where Portfolio risk 
differences is persistently negative, pointing to more conservative regulator estimates. 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
3.1. Empirical Model and Key Variables 




𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑏𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝑢𝑙𝑡.           (1) 
 
The outcome variable Cost of credit is the all-in spread drawn (AISD) of loan facility l 
originated at time t. AISD equals the spread of the loan facility over LIBOR plus any facility 
fees. The main coefficient of interest in Equation (1) is 𝑎1, which indicates the effect of 
portfolio risk differences on the cost of credit. In line with Hypothesis 1, we expect 𝑎1 to be 
negative if the differences between the market and regulator estimations of risk increase market 
discipline, imposing a competition effect and thus lowering the cost of credit offered by banks 
to borrowing firms. 
Portfolio risk differences for each lender 𝑏 at time 𝑡 are the (standardized) residuals 𝑒 
of the OLS regression of a lender’s asset volatility (Bank asset volatility) on the lender’s ratio 
of capital to risk-weighted assets (RBC ratio), or: 
 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑏𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑅𝐵𝐶 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑏𝑡 + 𝑒𝑏𝑡.                                                              (2) 
 
The residuals from Equation (2) capture components of the market perception of lender risk 
that are not embedded in the regulatory measure of lender risk, with results reported in Table 
A2 (columns (1)-(2)). A positive (negative) residual means that the assessment of a bank’s 
portfolio risk according to the market is higher (lower) than the assessment made by regulatory 
authorities. This is our primary measure for asymmetric information between markets and 
regulators regarding bank portfolio risk.  
We include capital in our original measure because markets observe bank capitalization 
in formulating their own bank risk assessment.1 Thus, in line with increasing capital stringency 
                                                 
1 The bank’s regulatory capital is composed of Core Tier 1 (common equity, retained earnings, minority interests, 
some preference shares), Additional Tier 1 (some preference shares, hybrid capital), and Tier 2 (e.g., undisclosed 
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during our sample period, holding low capital buffers gives a poor signal to markets. However, 
using the RBC ratio to estimate Portfolio risk differences can also lead to two different 
explanations of our findings. First, there might be a capital arbitrage effect, whereby good 
banks strategically manage their capital buffers allowing these banks to offer more competitive 
lending terms. Second, a lower RBC ratio might signal an excessive risk-taking story, triggered 
by a lending expansion. 
To exclude these alternative explanations, we also use the ratio of risk-weighted assets 
to total assets (RWA ratio) in order to estimate Portfolio risk differences instead of the RBC 
ratio. Then, controlling for the RWA ratio, must fully account for the capital arbitrage story 
(capital is not part of Portfolio risk differences anymore) and the excess risk-taking story (the 
excess risk-taking is controlled by the RWA ratio). To construct the RWA-based Portfolio risk 
differences, we estimate Equation (2) by replacing RBC ratio with RWA ratio; we report results 
in columns (3)-(4) of Table A2.  
The correlation between Bank asset volatility and RBC ratio in our sample is low and 
equal to negative 3%. On the other hand, Bank asset volatility has a strongly positive correlation 
with RWA ratio, equal to 44%; this value is in line with Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013). The 
correlation between our RBC-based Portfolio risk differences and RBC ratio is negative, equal 
to 43%, and highly significant, whereas that of the RWA-based Portfolio risk differences and 
RWA ratio is positive and equal to 60%. Clearly, RBC ratio and RWA ratio do not move hand 
in hand. This largely owes to the fact that banks have some discretion in setting the regulatory 
capital buffers. 
Accordingly, we adopt two baseline specifications: the first includes our initial portfolio 
risk differences measure (the residuals of the regression of Bank asset volatility on RBC ratio). 
                                                 
reserves, subordinated debt). Core Tier 1 and Additional Tier 1 must be at least 4% of risk-weighted assets (2% 
each), while Tier 2 must be at least 4%, resulting in a minimum total capital of 8% of the bank’s risk-weighted 
assets. Following the implementation of Basel III (scheduled for January 1, 2023), Core Tier 1 must be at least 
4.5%, Additional Tier 1 must be at least 1.5%, and Tier 2 at least 2%, for a total capital of 8.5%. 
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In the second specification we replace the RBC-based measure with the RWA-based measure 
(i.e., the residuals of the regression of Bank asset volatility on RWA ratio). We run all the 
models twice and include the constituents of Portfolio risk differences as control variables. 
The suitability of asset volatility as a measure for bank portfolio risk stems from its 
ability to reflect asset value changes, liability value changes, and other developments in off-
balance items and operating efficiency. To derive a bank’s asset volatility, we follow prior 
literature (e.g., Ronn and Verma, 1986; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Flannery and Rangan, 
2008; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013) and use the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing 
model. Specifically, bank equity (𝑉𝑇) at time 𝑇 is modeled as a call option on bank assets with 
strike price equal to the promised debt payment (i.e., the bank’s total liabilities 𝐿𝛵): 
 𝑉𝑇 = max[𝑉𝑇 − 𝐿𝑇 , 0].                                                                                                                          (3) 
 
 Therefore, the market value of bank equity (𝑉𝐸,𝑡) at time 𝑡 (with 𝑡 < 𝑇) is expressed as 
a function of the (unobservable) market value of bank assets (𝑉𝐴,𝑡), satisfying: 
 𝑉𝐸,𝑡 = 𝑉𝐴,𝑡𝑁(𝑑1,𝑡) − 𝐿𝑡𝑒−𝑟𝑓𝑇𝑁(𝑑2,𝑡),                                                                                               (4) 
 
with             
 
𝑑1,𝑡 = [ln (𝑉𝐴,𝑡 𝐿𝑡⁄ ) + (𝑟𝑓𝑡 + 12 𝜎𝛢,𝑡) 𝑇] 𝜎𝛢,𝑡𝑇,⁄                                                                                        (5) 
 




𝑑2,𝑡 = 𝑑1,𝑡 − 𝜎𝛢,𝑡𝑇.                                                                                                                                 (6) 
 
Based on Merton (1974), the value of bank equity is a function of the value of bank 
assets and time so that the volatility of bank equity (𝜎𝐸,𝑡) is related to the volatility of bank 
assets (𝜎𝛢,𝑡): 
 
𝜎𝐸,𝑡 = 𝑉𝐴,𝑡𝑉𝐸,𝑡 𝑁(𝑑1,𝑡)𝜎𝛢,𝑡.                                                                                                                          (7) 
 
 In Equation (4), the term 𝑁(𝑑1,𝑡) can be interpreted as the factor by which the present 
value of the contingent receipt of bank assets (discounted at risk-free rate 𝑟𝑓𝑇) exceeds the 
current value of bank assets, while 𝑁(𝑑2,𝑡) reflects the probability of the (bank closure) option 
being exercised.  
By simultaneously solving Equations (4) and (7) and setting 𝑇 = 1, we extract 𝜎𝛢,𝑡 for 
each bank annually. Similarly to Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013), we employ as starting 
values for 𝜎𝛢,𝑡 the historical annualized yearly standard deviation of bank equity returns, 
multiplied by the ratio of the market value of bank equity to the sum of the market value of 
bank equity and the book value of bank total liabilities; that is: 
 𝜎𝐴,𝑡 = 𝜎𝐸,𝑡𝑉𝐸,𝑡 (𝑉𝐸,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑡)⁄ .                                                                                                                 (8) 
 
 Through an iterative process we use a Newton search algorithm to calculate the 
(implied) yearly values for bank asset volatility (𝜎𝛢,𝑡) and bank asset value (𝑉𝐴,𝑡). The resulting 
measure (𝜎𝛢,𝑡) is our preferred market-based measure for bank risk and we use it as the 
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dependent variable in Equation (2). For our sample of banks, the mean (median) bank asset 
volatility, expressed in percentages, is 2.42 (1.89).  
 
3.2. Identification, Controls, and Fixed Effects 
The key aim of our empirical analysis is to identify the causal effect of Portfolio risk differences 
on the Cost of credit. Simultaneity and reverse causality are not the main identification 
problems because bank capital and risk are predetermined when new loan decisions are made. 
For us, the main problem is omitted-variable bias, especially in distinguishing between loan 
supply and loan demand. 
Consistent with related studies (e.g., Sufi, 2007; Ivashina, 2009; Delis, Hasan, and 
Ongena, 2020), we control for the log of the loan amount, loan maturity (in months), the 
number of participant banks in a syndicate, dummies for performance-pricing provisions and 
collateral, and the total number of covenants. We also conduct sensitivity tests without loan 
control variables to confirm that our model is not subject to a “bad controls” problem. We 
further control for bank characteristics, such as bank size, return on assets, and non-performing 
loans; likewise, our set of firm-level controls include firm size, firm return on assets, and firm 
Tobin’s Q. Consistent with the literature (e.g., Ivashina, 2009; Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, and 
Hirsch, 2019), all bank controls and firm controls are lagged. We provide exact definitions of 
these variables in Table 1 and summary statistics in Table 2. As seen in Table 2, Portfolio risk 
differences assumes more often negative values, which is expected because regulatory capital 
is designed to be a buffer against potential adverse shocks. Positive values would imply an 
inherent deficiency in the regulators’ methodology to create a buffer. Thus, under normal 
circumstances, we expect the markets to be less strict in their assessment of bank portfolio risk. 
To maintain a high level of variation in Portfolio risk differences we initially consider 
a specification with a very simple set of fixed effects – namely, loan type and purpose, year-, 
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bank-, firm-, and lender’s country-level effects – allowing us to estimate the coefficient on our 
portfolio risk differences measure for the largest possible number of banks and firms in our 
sample. However, since our basic hypothesis is that the interest rate response to changes in our 
risk differences measure is supply-driven, we adopt more restrictive fixed effects in subsequent 
specifications.  
Importantly, we use firm × year fixed effects to control for time-varying firm-side 
(demand-side) explanations for our findings such as firm-year changes in risk, changes in loan 
demand, and borrowers’ corporate governance, etc. This means that to estimate Equation (1) 
we obtain identification from firms with at least two loan facilities extended within the same 
year. Moreover, the inclusion of lender’s country × year fixed effects shields our specification 
from country-year (macroeconomic) developments in the lender’s country. The regression still 
yields results on the main coefficient of interest because there are multiple loan facilities from 
the same country within a year, with the inclusion of borrower’s country × year fixed effects 
as an additional sensitivity test serving the same purpose for the borrower’s country. 
Furthermore, country-pair fixed effects control for exchange rate dynamics and trade balance 
dynamics between the given pair of lender and borrower countries. Our last set of fixed effects 
includes those at the quarter level, which eliminates any undesired variation beyond the 
quarterly frequency not absorbed by our remaining fixed effects.  
 
4. The Effect of Portfolio Risk Differences on the Cost of Credit 
4.1. Baseline Results 
We begin our analysis by horse racing our portfolio risk differences measures with their main 
terms, namely bank asset volatility, and the RBC and RWA ratios. For this reason, in Table 3 
we sequentially include different combinations of our RBC-based Portfolio risk differences 
with its constituents (each of the regulatory- and market-based measures); in Table 4, we 
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replicate this analysis for the RWA-based measure. This will allow us to isolate the effect of 
Portfolio risk differences from its components and further identify whether the disciplining 
effect exerted by portfolio risk differences is market- or regulatory-driven. Table 3 reports the 
results of the estimation of Equation (1) including the coefficient estimates and t-statistics 
obtained from standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank.2 Our preferred 
specification includes loan type and purpose, bank, firm × year, and lender’s country × year 
fixed effects. We choose the given set of fixed effects as they control to a reasonable extent for 
time-varying loan-demand forces and macroeconomic fundamentals without being 
overburdened by fixed effects, thereby allowing for sufficient variation in our variable of 
interest. 
In the first two columns of Table 3 (Table 4), Portfolio risk differences is interacted 
with Bank asset volatility and RBC ratio (RWA ratio), respectively. The coefficient on Portfolio 
risk differences is negative and statistically significant in both specifications, ranging between 
8.5 and 11.4 basis points in response to a one standard deviation increase in the RBC-based 
measure (=42.5 basis points × 0.20 and 57 basis points × 0.20 respectively in Table 3) and 
between 7.9 and 10.2 basis points for the RWA-based measure (Table 4). The effect of Bank 
asset volatility is picked up by Portfolio risk differences in column (1) of either table, while the 
regulatory measure appears significant for syndicated loan spreads in column (2). The effect of 
each of our regulatory measures of bank portfolio risk on loan spreads is consistent with prior 
studies (e.g., Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia, 2002; Santos and Winton, 2019).  In specific, a one 
standard deviation increase in RBC ratio decreases AISD by 6.2 basis points (=2.2 basis points × 2.8 in Table 3), whereas the same increase in RWA ratio raises spreads by 23.8 basis points 
(=1.1 basis points × 21.1 in Table 4). However, the effect of the regulatory estimates is 
                                                 




independent of the effect exerted by the risk differences measures, with either RBC ratio or 
RWA ratio failing to absorb the size and significance of the coefficient on Portfolio risk 
differences. 
 [Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
Presenting the individual components of our Portfolio risk differences in column (3), 
we observe the relative dominance of regulatory risk estimates over market-based estimates. 
RBC ratio comes with a negative and non-statistically significant value (Table 3), while RWA 
ratio is positive and statistically significant (Table 4); Bank asset volatility does not affect loan 
spreads in either case. When including all of our measures concurrently in column (4) of Tables 
3 and 4, Bank asset volatility and RBC ratio retain their non-statistically significant 
coefficients, while RWA ratio remains positive and statistically significant. In both cases, our 
risk differences measures retain their negative and statistically significant sign. It appears that 
although regulatory estimates have a relatively greater impact than their market-based 
counterparts, it is also the difference between the two (and the relevant information asymmetry) 
that exerts a disciplining (negative) effect on bank loan spreads. 
Based on specification (4) of Table 3, the main coefficient of interest, 𝑎1, reveals that 
a one standard deviation increase in Portfolio risk differences decreases AISD by an average of 
11.6 basis points (=58.1 basis points × 0.20). Economically, this is a sizeable effect, equal to a 
4.3% (=11.6 basis points ÷ 272.1 basis points) decrease for the average loan amount in our 
sample. Given that the average loan size is USD 352 million, banks with increased asset 
volatility relative to the regulatory estimation of their portfolio risk lose approximately USD 
0.41 million (=USD 352 million × 11.6 basis points) per year in foregone interest revenue. For 
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an average loan maturity of 5.0 years, this represents approximately USD 2.03 million in 
interest losses over the loan’s duration.3 
However, this forms only part of the picture: each lead bank in our sample grants on 
average 26.1 loans per year, while the average bank share for the available observations is 
24.0%. Assuming that the loan share figure is representative of the average lender in our 
sample, the overall annual cost arising from the lender’s total loan operations within a given 
year increases to USD 2.57 million (=USD 0.41 million × 26.1 loans × 24.0% share).4 
In Tables 5 and 6 we consider different sets of fixed effects in the regressions for the 
RBC-based and the RWA-based measure respectively. In column (1) of each table, we start 
with our less demanding specification where we include loan type and purpose, year, bank, 
firm, and lender’s country fixed effects. In column (2) we add firm × year fixed effects, 
controlling for loan-demand forces for each firm-year. In column (3) we add lender’s country 
× year fixed effects that control for time-varying macroeconomic conditions in the bank’s 
country along with borrower’s country, and country-pair fixed effects. Specification (4) is even 
more demanding, as we add borrower’s country × year fixed effects, controlling for the 
macroeconomic environment in the borrowing firm’s country, while our last specification 
(column 5) introduces quarter fixed effects, which control for any remaining variations at the 
quarterly level. Across all specifications we find that larger Portfolio risk differences exert a 
negative, statistically significant effect on loan spreads. Across these specifications the 
coefficients on Portfolio risk differences are consistently negative and statistically significant 
at all conventional levels.  
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here] 
                                                 
3 Assuming five annual payments and LIBOR as the discount rate, the increase in interest expense equals USD 
1.92 million for the average 12-month LIBOR rate of 2.1% during our sample period (for similar calculations, see 
Ivashina and Sun, 2011). 
4 Bank share is only reported for 6,252 of the 42,857 loan facilities in our sample. Generalizing this average to 
apply to all loan facilities is a plausible assumption, since it is not very different from the average loan share 
values reported in previous studies (e.g., Sufi, 2007; Ivashina, 2009). 
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We consequently examine any asymmetric effects exerted by our risk differences 
measure on loan spreads. To this end we interact Portfolio risk differences with an indicator 
for the group of banks with Portfolio risk differences above our sample mean. Since the average 
Portfolio risk difference in our sample is -0.18, a one standard deviation increase in this 
measure (raising the mean value by 0.20) will automatically move the average bank into the 
positive risk differences group, wherein its market risk is deemed higher than its regulatory 
risk (or increase the risk differences value of banks with already positive Portfolio risk 
differences yet further). We present results for our RBC- and RWA-based measures in Table 7 
(columns 1 and 2 respectively).  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
In either case, Portfolio risk differences has a positive, statistically significant 
coefficient, with the significance of our risk differences measures being picked up by our 
interaction term (the coefficient on Portfolio risk differences × Positive risk differences). These 
results reveal that the (negative) effect of portfolio risk differences on loan spreads is not 
symmetric across all banks, but is instead focused in banks considered higher risk by markets 
than by regulators. Banks with negative risk differences are affected the least, if at all, 
suggesting that a higher regulatory assessment acts as a safeguard against lending cost. 
Based on our estimates in Tables 3–7, and consistent with Hypothesis 1, we can infer 
that wider differences between regulatory and market-based measures of bank portfolio risk 
substantially decrease the cost of loans offered by banks, ceteris paribus. We illustrate the 
implications of this estimate by considering the example of a prominent U.S. bank, Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch. During our sample period, the average Portfolio risk differences value 
for Bank of America is -0.12, meaning that the market-based assessment of its portfolio risk is 
lower than the regulatory assessment. Furthermore, the average AISD on the loan facilities 
granted by Bank of America when its Portfolio risk differences is below its mean value is 
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280.19 basis points, approximately 19% higher than the above-mean value of 235.02 basis 
points. Looking at specific sub-periods, from 2013 to 2016, Bank of America’s average 
Portfolio risk differences is -0.31, the average AISD on its loans is 267.23 basis points, and the 
average amount of each loan is USD 392 million. However, during the 2002–2005 period the 
mean value for Bank of America’s Portfolio risk differences is 0.09, the average AISD is 231.51 
basis points, and the average loan amount is less than half of its amount nearly a decade later: 
USD 176 million. Similar examples exist for other leading banks predominantly based in 
countries with developed economies. 
In Table A3 of the Appendix, we examine the sensitivity of our estimates to the “bad 
controls” problem by interchangeably excluding loan-level control variables from our 
specifications.5,6 Irrespective of the specifications used, the coefficient on Portfolio risk 
differences retains its negative, statistically significant value, ranging between 8.1 and 10.8 
basis points per one standard deviation increase. We further run a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) model that accounts for the simultaneous setting of the price and non-price 
loan terms by the lending banks at the time of the loan origination (Gropp, Gruendl, and 
Guettler, 2014). In this setting we estimate a system of regressions where, in addition to AISD, 
a number of different loan terms, namely Loan amount, Maturity, Collateral, and Number of 
lenders, and the components of our portfolio risk differences measures (Bank asset volatility, 
RBC ratio, and RWA ratio) are regressed on the same set of regressors in our baseline equation 
(including the AISD). Results in Table A4 confirm the robustness of our baseline OLS 
                                                 
5 Since the “bad controls” problem is due to differences in the composition of loans to a given firm, in an 
alternative sensitivity test, we include weights based on the number and amount of loans received by each firm 
(results available upon request). 
6 The replacement (or addition) of Number of covenants with the number of financial covenants or net covenants 
leaves our results unchanged. 
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estimates; in fact, the results of our baseline models appear to be considerably conservative 
compared to those under the SUR framework.7 
The size and magnitude of the coefficients on the control variables in Tables 3–7 are 
generally in line with the prior works of Bae and Goyal (2009), Ivashina (2009), Cai, Eidam, 
Saunders, and Steffen (2018), and Delis, Hasan, and Ongena (2020). In particular, loan spreads 
decrease with loan amount and increase with maturity as well as being more competitively 
priced when collateral and more performance provisions are included in the spread. The role 
of bank-characteristics is also largely anticipated, with greater return on assets associated with 
decreasing AISD while increased non-performing loans are associated with higher loan spreads. 
Moreover, either of our regulatory estimates of bank risk exert an independent and statistically 
significant effect, as lower levels of regulatory capital and higher levels of risk-weighted assets 
increase loan spreads (which is consistent with, among others, Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia, 
2002; Santos and Winton, 2019). 
 
4.2. Controlling for market information asymmetry 
Thus far our results show that greater information asymmetry between markets and regulators 
with regards to bank portfolio risk exerts a significant effect on bank loan spreads over and 
above that exerted by the individual market and regulatory measures of bank risk. However, 
information asymmetry might also be present between market participants themselves, owing 
to the inherent opacity of banks. Moreover, this market information asymmetry might coexist 
with the market-regulatory information asymmetry in shaping bank loan spreads.  
In this regard, this section introduces a measure of the relative opacity of banks, based 
on the disagreement of the major credit rating agencies (Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s) as 
                                                 
7 For expositional purposes, we only report estimates from the regressions where the dependent variable is AISD. 
The estimates from the other equations in the model are available on request. 
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a proxy for uncertainty (see Morgan, 2002). We include this proxy (Split rating), along with 
one of the agencies’ rating (Bank rating) in our regressions for the RBC- and RWA-based 
portfolio risk measures in Table 8 (columns 1 and 2 respectively). In either specification, our 
rating disagreement measure, although positive, exerts a non-statistically significant effect on 
loan spreads. This is not the case for the individual credit rating, an increase of which 
(suggesting a deterioration in the bank’s rating) results in lower spreads. For what matters, the 
coefficient on Portfolio risk differences is consistently negative and statistically significant 
(largely exceeding our baseline estimates), indicating that what matters is the discrepancy 
between the market and book value of risk and not disagreement between rating agencies.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
4.3. Additional Sensitivity Tests 
In Table A5, we test our results’ sensitivity to the type of standard error clustering. We initially 
consider our RBC-based portfolio risk differences measure: column (1) features clustering by 
lender country and year, column (2) by bank and year, while in column (3) we adopt even more 
demanding clustering, such as lender’s country and bank and year.8 In columns (4)-(6) we 
adopt the same clustering for the regressions of our RWA-based measure. Across all 
specifications, the coefficient on Portfolio risk differences is similar to that of our baseline 
specification. We next re-estimate our baseline specification by employing different versions 
of our original portfolio risk differences measure and report the results in Table A6. 
Specifically, we use a common risk-free rate for all EMU countries in Equation (4) (columns 
(1) and (4)), and estimate Equation (2) without a constant (columns (2) and (5)), and for each 
bank separately (columns (3) and (6)).  
                                                 
8 In unreported regressions we further adopted less demanding clustering, namely at the loan-level, the bank-level, 
the firm-level, and at the lender’s country-level. 
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So far, we have assumed that all loans enter the model weighted equally. While the 
fixed effects in Tables 5-6 provide a safeguard against cross-country variation, we nevertheless 
acknowledge that our empirical specification might be open to criticism that borrower countries 
receiving more or fewer loans could disproportionately affect our results. To this end, in Table 
A7 we use weighted least squares and several different weights based on the proportion of 
loans between a given bank-firm pair or country-pair to the total number of loans in our sample, 
retaining the same set of fixed effects. Our results are very similar to the baseline. 
 
4.4. Accounting for Sample Selection Bias 
In this section we consider whether our results are affected by selection bias if the effect of 
Portfolio risk differences on AISD is due to firms borrowing from relatively riskier banks in 
order to obtain more favorable loan terms. To exclude this possibility we follow Dass and 
Massa (2011) in employing Heckman’s (1979) two-stage model. In the first stage we estimate 
a probit model of the probability of a firm borrowing from the given bank. We then calculate 
Heckman’s lambda (inverse Mills ratio) and include it as an additional control variable in the 
second-stage OLS estimation of Equation (1). We include all syndicated loan facilities in 
DealScan, providing enough information for the first-stage probit to estimate the determinants 
of a firm’s decision to borrow from a given lead bank. Similar to Dass and Massa (2011), we 
assume that a firm’s decision to obtain a syndicated loan is a function of the main determinants 
of its decision to borrow in general. These determinants consist of a set of loan, bank and firm 
characteristics, and loan type and purpose, year, firm, and borrower’s country dummies. 
We report the results in Table A8. According to the probit estimates in columns (1)-(4) 
of Panel A, the larger the Tobin’s Q and leverage of a firm, the more likely it is to complete a 
syndicated loan deal. Unsurprisingly, firms opt for syndicate financing when seeking loans 
with longer maturity; however, these loans require increasing amounts of collateral. Most 
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importantly, the estimates from the second-stage regressions in columns (1)-(4) of Panel B 
confirm the strong negative effect of Portfolio risk differences on AISD. In fact, this effect is 
significantly larger than in our baseline estimations, amounting to 9.3–13 basis points per one 
standard deviation increase in our risk differences measures. 
 
5. The Role of Bank Characteristics and Lending Relationships  
The previous section documents how greater differences between the markets and the 
regulators in their assessments of bank portfolio risk lead to lower loan spreads. This section 
builds on our findings that the effect of portfolio risk differences is supply-driven and examine 
whether the effect of differences in portfolio risk varies across different bank types and bank 
financial health. To allow the direct interpretation of the coefficient estimates on both the 
interaction term and the main terms, we mean-center the variables included in the interaction 
terms. We present the results in Table 9, with each column including the interaction of Portfolio 
risk differences with a different bank-level characteristic. 
[Insert Table 9 about here]  
We first consider banks’ financial health (variables that proxy for bank performance 
and credit risk), expecting that more profitable, better-managed banks might have less need to 
establish their creditworthiness. According to the estimates in columns (1) and (4) the effect of 
Portfolio risk differences relates inversely to a bank’s return on assets, suggesting that stronger 
bank performance acts as a counterforce to cutting loan spreads. Specifically, banks achieving 
an additional 2.2% return on their assets are able to contain their interest loss by approximately 
9.7-12% (the coefficients on the interaction terms). This is expected because stronger 
performance favorably affects private agent expectations. Moreover, columns (2) and (5) show 
that banks completely offset the discount in their offered loan rates by limiting the proportion 
of non-performing loans in their portfolio. Specifically, a decrease of one standard deviation in 
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Bank NPLs brings an increase in AISD of more than 2.3 basis points, reversing by almost 17-
21.5% the initial interest rate discount (coefficients on Portfolio risk differences × Bank NPLs). 
 In columns (3) and (6) we consider the role of bank credit ratings, which are frequently 
employed by market participants and regulatory authorities as general measures of 
creditworthiness, although these ratings are more static and less responsive to various 
systematic and idiosyncratic events than our principal risk differences measure. A downgrade 
in the bank’s risk-weighting category has a negative effect on loan spreads, with the coefficient 
on the interaction between Portfolio risk differences and Bank category downgrade being 
negative and statistically significant. Importantly, the downgrade event is not able to absorb 
the negative and strongly significant effect of our portfolio risk differences measures, which is 
even stronger relative to our baseline. 
Relationship lending (where each counterparty acquires valuable information on the 
other counterparty’s operations and credit risk) is another important source of heterogeneity in 
the effect of Portfolio risk differences on bank lending. Due to the resulting reduction of 
information asymmetry and their private information on relationship customers, it is possible 
that banks do not provide the same discounts on loans offered to repeat borrowers compared to 
those for new borrowers. In Table 10, we use measures that reflect the existence and intensity 
of a prior bank–firm lending relationship (as in Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan, 
2009). Our basic measure is the existence of a prior loan between a given bank–firm pair within 
a five-year period (columns (1) and (4)). We observe that the lead bank is able to recover 
approximately 4.8-5 basis points or 37-48.1% of the initial interest loss due to Portfolio risk 
differences (the coefficients on the interaction terms). We consequently employ alternative 
measures based on the number (amount) of loans between a given bank–firm pair as part of the 
total number (amount) of loans received by the firm within the five-year period: columns (2)-
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(3) and (5)-(6) confirm that this effect further depends on the intensity and magnitude of the 
lending relationship.  
 [Insert Table 10 about here] 
Overall, and consistent with Hypothesis 2, the analysis in this section shows that the 
effect of portfolio risk differences is contingent on a lending bank’s performance and 
management practices as well as prior transactions with the borrowing firm.  
 
6. Enticing the borrowing firm 
Having analyzed the mechanisms for reducing the cost of information asymmetry, a natural 
question arising is what enables borrowers to extract concessions from banks via a lower loan 
spread. We expect this bargaining power of the borrowers to stem primarily from the 
sustainability of the lending relationship per se. Arguably, there are qualitative and quantitative 
costs associated with the decision to end the lending relationship (Ongena and Smith, 2001; 
Farinha and Santos, 2002). The potential break in the lending relationship can be costly to the 
bank, both in monetary terms (in the form of increasing monitoring costs) and in terms of 
reputation, especially if other banks infer that this is due to negative private information about 
the firm revealed to the distressed lender. 
We examine this premise in columns (1) and (6) of Table 10, where we examine the 
effect of our RBC- and RWA-based portfolio risk differences measures on the probability of 
ending the lending relationship. Indeed, our estimates show that a rise in bank portfolio risk 
compromises the viability of the lending relationship. Portfolio risk differences exhibits a 
positive and statistically significant relationship with the probability that the borrowing firm 
will not borrow from the given bank in the following 2-year period.9 We further trace whether 
the probability of ending a bank-firm relationship is contingent on certain loan and firm traits. 
                                                 
9 In Table A9 we replicate this exercise by employing alternative estimation methods. 
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In this regard, all subsequent specifications include the interaction of our portfolio risk 
differences measure with a number of loan and firm characteristics. 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
Due to lower information asymmetries, the cost of providing loans is lower for a 
relationship lender, which enables borrowers to gain access to more favorable financing terms 
relative to those offered under transactional borrowing (Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan, 2009; Dass and Massa, 2011). Intuitively, favorable loan terms matter more for 
firms dependent on long-term financing; we therefore expect loan maturity to exert a 
differential negative impact on the probability of ending the existing relationship. The negative 
and statistically significant coefficients on Portfolio risk differences × Maturity in columns (2) 
and (7) confirm this conjecture. 
We further expect that firms paying higher upfront fees are reluctant to maintain their 
relationship with a riskier bank. For term loans, the upfront fee is conceptually the same as the 
original issue discount (OID), i.e., the borrower receives the notional reduced by the upfront 
fee/OID. As a result, lenders must hand over less than the full face value at origination, while 
spreads and principal repayments are calculated on the basis of the full face value (Berg, 
Saunders, and Steffen, 2016; Bruche, Malherbe, and Meisenzahl, 2020).10 It seems plausible 
that the higher the fee, the greater the incentive to withdraw from the relationship in the near 
future. In columns (3) and (7), we find that the probability of ending a relationship is indeed 
higher for loans with higher upfront fees. 
Moreover, a stronger bank-firm relationship might imply better firm governance, which 
in turn should lead to higher valuation (Dass and Massa, 2011). We therefore, expect that firms 
with high Tobin’s Q and profitability indicators have less to gain from the preservation of the 
lending relationship. We examine this premise by distinguishing between firms located in the 
                                                 
10 Credit lines do not have an OID as they are not fully funded at origination. 
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top 25th percentile of our sample in terms of their Tobin’s Q (columns (4) and (9)) and return 
on assets (columns (5) and (10)) levels. Our estimates reveal that the probability of a break in 
the lending relationship increases for highly valued and profitable firms. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we note observable differences between risk perceptions of financial markets and 
regulators with regards to banks. We maintain that they proxy the degree of information 
asymmetry between regulators and markets pertaining to bank portfolio risk. We examine the 
effect of such information asymmetry on the loan pricing decisions of banks, using data from 
the syndicated loan market. 
 Our baseline specification shows that a one standard deviation increase in our measure 
of portfolio risk differences reduces loan spreads by more than 11 basis points (equivalent to a 
4.3% increase), rendering banks subject to a loss of about USD 2.03 million in interest revenue 
over the duration of the average loan. Considering that the average lead bank extends 
approximately 26 loan facilities per year, in which it retains an average 24% stake, the annual 
cost increases to USD 2.57 million. These results persist in an array of sensitivity exercises and 
alternative estimation methods, and are most significant when portfolio risk differences are 
positive (i.e., market estimations of bank risk are higher than regulatory estimations). 
Importantly, the separate effects of market and regulatory risk (i.e., not their difference) are 
less potent.  
We further show that the effect of portfolio risk differences is heterogeneous to the 
financial health of banks. For banks with higher profitability ratios, better credit ratings and 
lower levels of non-performing loans, the negative effect of portfolio risk differences is much 
less potent, if at all present. Even for banks exposed to this negative effect, the formation of 
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strong bank-firm relationships can reduce the adverse effects of information asymmetries 
between markets and regulators on their loan spreads.  
Finally, we examine the implications of the market-regulatory information asymmetry 
for the sustainability of bank-firm relationships. Ending a lending relationship is costly to both 
banks and firms. However if the bank is unable to offer better loan spreads, we find that the 
higher informational asymmetry surrounding the lead bank’s stability makes an imminent 
termination to the bank-firm relationship a credible and viable threat which the borrower can 
exploit. Thus, we find that the probability of ending a relationship is higher for loans of shorter 
maturities and higher upfront fees. Similarly, relationships are more likely to end for highly 
valued and profitable firms.     
Our findings offer an important first step in the direction of future research focused on 
the influence of the stability of the banks on their lending decisions and the information 
disclosure reforms needed to close the information gaps between markets and bank regulators 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable  Description Source 
   
A. Dependent variables in main specifications 




B. Main explanatory variables: Difference between market-based and regulatory measure of bank risk 
Portfolio risk differences The residuals from the regression of Bank asset volatility on RBC ratio. The RWA-
based measure is the residuals from the regression of Bank asset volatility on RWA 
ratio. 
Own estimations 
Positive risk differences A binary variable equal to one for values of Portfolio risk differences above our sample 
mean, and zero otherwise. 
Own estimations 
   
C. Explanatory variables: Loan characteristics 
Loan amount Log of the loan facility amount in USD. DealScan 
Maturity  Loan duration in months. DealScan 
Collateral A binary variable equal to one if the loan is secured with collateral, and zero otherwise. DealScan 
Number of lenders The number of banks involved in the syndicated loan (lead and participant banks). DealScan 
Performance provisions A binary variable equal to one if the loan has performance pricing provisions, and zero 
otherwise. 
DealScan 
Number of covenants The total number of covenants in the loan contract. DealScan 
Number of participants The number of participant banks involved in the syndicated loan. DealScan 
Upfront fee The one-time fee paid by the borrower to lender(s) at the loan closing date as a 
percentage of the loan facility amount (%). 
DealScan 
Loan type A series of dummy variables indicating loan type (e.g., term loans, revolvers, etc.). DealScan 
Loan purpose A series of dummy variables indicating loan purpose (e.g., corporate purpose, debt 
repay, etc.). 
DealScan 
Relationship lending A binary variable equal to one for a prior loan facility between the lender and the 






The ratio of the number of prior loan facilities between the lender and the borrower in 
the 5-year period before the loan facility’s origination year to the total number of 





The ratio of the amount of prior loan facilities between the lender and the borrower in 
the 5-year period before the loan facility’s origination year to the total amount of 
loans received by the borrower during the same period.  
DealScan 
 
Break in relationship 
lending 
A binary variable equal to one if the borrower receives a loan in the 2-year period 





   
D. Explanatory variables: Lender characteristics 
 Bank asset volatility The volatility of bank assets estimated via option pricing theory (%). Datastream 
own estimations 
RBC ratio The ratio of bank capital to risk-weighted assets (%). Compustat 
RWA ratio The ratio of risk-weighted assets to total bank assets (%). Compustat 
Bank size The log of total bank assets. Compustat 
Bank ROA The return on total bank assets (%). Compustat 
Bank NPLs The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (%). Compustat 
Split rating A binary variable equal to one if the bank’s credit rating assigned by S&P is different 
than the credit rating assigned by Moody’s, and zero otherwise. The variable is only 




Bank rating The bank’s numerical credit rating assigned by S&P. The variable assumes values 
from 1 (corresponding to AAA rating) to 22 (corresponding to D/SD rating). 
S&P Capital IQ 
Bank category 
downgrade 
A binary variable equal to one for a downgrade in the bank’s risk-weighting 
category, and zero otherwise. 
S&P Capital IQ 
   
E. Explanatory variables: Borrower characteristics 
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Firm size The log of total firm assets. Compustat 
Firm ROA The return on total firm assets (%). Compustat 
Firm Tobin’s Q The log of firm’s Tobin’s Q. Compustat 
Firm leverage The firm’s leverage (%). Compustat 
   
F. Explanatory variables: Lender’s country characteristics 




GDP per capita The difference in annual GDP per capita in constant prices between the lender’s and 





The difference in stock market capitalization between the lender’s and the borrower’s 
countries. Stock market capitalization is measured as the total value (in USD) of all 
listed shares in the borrower’s country stock market as a percentage of GDP. 
WDI 





Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variable definitions are in Table 1. 
 Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
AISD 42,857 272.07 176.84 1.00 1,750.00 
Portfolio risk differences 42,857 -0.18 0.20 -1.82 2.12 
Positive risk differences 42,857 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Portfolio risk differences (RWA-based) 42,857 -0.17 0.20 -2.17 2.14 
Positive risk differences (RWA-based) 42,857 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Loan amount 42,857 18.50 1.58 10.88 24.62 
Maturity 42,857 59.50 34.22 1.00 540.00 
Collateral 42,857 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Number of lenders 42,857 7.46 7.74 1.00 161.00 
Performance provisions 42,857 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Number of covenants 42,857 0.54 1.10 0.00 7.00 
Number of participants 42,857 4.53 6.70 0.00 159.00 
Upfront fee 4,432 0.95 0.98 0.00 10.00 
Relationship lending 42,857 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Relationship lending number 42,857 0.18 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Relationship lending amount 42,714 0.19 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Break in relationship lending 42,857 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Bank asset volatility 42,857 2.42 1.93 0.07 18.39 
RBC ratio 42,857 13.89 2.79 1.10 30.48 
RWA ratio 42,857 54.45 21.08 0.05 168.48 
Bank size 42,857 12.02 1.53 5.67 19.55 
Bank ROA 42,857 0.90 2.17 -1.75 30.12 
Bank NPLs 42,857 2.08 2.32 0.01 34.31 
Split rating 18,788 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Bank rating 18,788 4.71 2.53 1.00 19.00 
Bank category downgrade 36,557 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Firm size 42,821 7.29 1.95 0.03 24.13 
Firm ROA 42,791 10.73 6.48 -50.22 30.88 
Firm Tobin’s Q 42,855 5.06 0.20 3.68 6.21 
Firm leverage 42,834 38.57 14.54 0.00 197.47 
GDP 41,840 20.53 157.11 -1,323.45 2,558.56 
GDP per capita 41,846 -2,072.89 11,954.36 -86,860.58 100,538.20 
Stock market capitalization 39,315 0.83 90.99 -1,158.55 1,201.18 
Interbank rate 39,335 -0.10 1.07 -33.53 6.77 
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Table 3. Portfolio risk differences (RBC-based). Market-based vs. regulatory measures 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 1. The 
estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. Each specification includes a different combination 
of the market-based, the regulatory-based, and the market-regulatory differences measures. Each specification includes a different set of 
fixed effects, as given in the penultimate part of the table. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique lenders (Number of 
banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In all specifications, Portfolio risk differences refers to the RBC-
based Portfolio risk differences. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Portfolio risk differences -42.532* -57.037***  -58.074*** 
 [-1.875] [-4.460]  [-2.741] 
Bank asset volatility -0.642  -3.359 0.143 
 [-0.166]  [-1.366] [0.041] 
RBC ratio  -2.207** -0.820 -2.228*** 
  [-2.093] [-0.706] [-2.854] 
Loan amount -9.486*** -9.485*** -9.483*** -9.485*** 
 [-8.218] [-8.215] [-8.225] [-8.213] 
Maturity 0.946*** 0.946*** 0.946*** 0.946*** 
 [4.279] [4.277] [4.277] [4.277] 
Collateral -15.459*** -15.487*** -15.536*** -15.487*** 
 [-3.310] [-3.305] [-3.315] [-3.307] 
Number of lenders -1.228 -1.218 -1.179 -1.218 
 [-1.563] [-1.557] [-1.550] [-1.534] 
Performance provisions -20.717*** -20.743*** -20.785*** -20.742*** 
 [-6.670] [-6.713] [-6.697] [-6.704] 
Number of covenants 1.902 1.935 1.916 1.934 
 [0.634] [0.639] [0.642] [0.646] 
Number of participants 0.466 0.452 0.422 0.452 
 [0.511] [0.495] [0.474] [0.490] 
Bank size -0.450 -0.454 -0.448 -0.454 
 [-1.268] [-1.278] [-1.262] [-1.281] 
Bank ROA -1.039*** -1.039*** -1.040*** -1.039*** 
 [-6.519] [-6.527] [-6.520] [-6.528] 
Bank NPLs 1.407*** 1.409*** 1.406*** 1.409*** 
 [4.452] [4.459] [4.444] [4.459] 
Constant 405.899*** 432.348*** 431.420*** 432.111*** 
 [22.153] [18.449] [18.170] [18.368] 
Observations 42,857 42,857 42,857 42,857 
Adj. R-squared 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.788 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 364 364 364 364 
Number of firms 10,230 10,230 10,230 10,230 
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Table 4. Portfolio risk differences (RWA-based). Market-based vs. regulatory measures 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 1. The 
estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. Each specification includes a different combination 
of the market-based, the regulatory-based, and the market-regulatory differences measures. Each specification includes a different set of 
fixed effects, as given in the penultimate part of the table. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique lenders (Number of 
banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In all specifications, Portfolio risk differences refers to the RWA-
based Portfolio risk differences. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Portfolio risk differences -39.239* -50.793***  -45.406* 
 [-1.836] [-4.277]  [-1.832] 
Bank asset volatility -0.835  -3.673 -0.847 
 [-0.214]  [-1.394] [-0.213] 
RWA ratio  1.128** 1.078** 1.128** 
  [2.511] [2.298] [2.503] 
Loan amount -9.486*** -9.495*** -9.492*** -9.495*** 
 [-8.219] [-8.256] [-8.260] [-8.253] 
Maturity 0.946*** 0.945*** 0.945*** 0.945*** 
 [4.279] [4.282] [4.282] [4.282] 
Collateral -15.460*** -15.639*** -15.703*** -15.644*** 
 [-3.310] [-3.322] [-3.332] [-3.325] 
Number of lenders -1.227 -1.249 -1.199 -1.244 
 [-1.562] [-1.629] [-1.607] [-1.592] 
Performance provisions -20.718*** -20.809*** -20.873*** -20.820*** 
 [-6.665] [-6.687] [-6.710] [-6.668] 
Number of covenants 1.900 1.794 1.816 1.807 
 [0.633] [0.580] [0.598] [0.593] 
Number of participants 0.465 0.487 0.444 0.483 
 [0.510] [0.545] [0.510] [0.534] 
Bank size -0.450 -0.447 -0.444 -0.447 
 [-1.267] [-1.255] [-1.247] [-1.256] 
Bank ROA -1.039*** -1.042*** -1.042*** -1.042*** 
 [-6.519] [-6.571] [-6.565] [-6.571] 
Bank NPLs 1.407*** 1.407*** 1.406*** 1.407*** 
 [4.451] [4.446] [4.439] [4.446] 
Constant 407.372*** 342.378*** 362.435*** 345.316*** 
 [22.120] [8.990] [10.207] [11.874] 
Observations 42,857 42,857 42,857 42,857 
Adj. R-squared 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.788 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 364 364 364 364 
Number of firms 10,230 10,230 10,230 10,230 
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Table 5. Portfolio risk differences (RBC-based). Different fixed effects 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in 
Table 1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. Each specification 
includes a different set of fixed effects, as given in the penultimate part of the table. The lower part of the table denotes 
the number of unique lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In all 
specifications, Portfolio risk differences refers to the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences. The *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Portfolio risk differences -59.286*** -38.594* -56.612*** -56.612*** -51.130*** 
 [-4.479] [-1.808] [-2.998] [-2.998] [-3.614] 
Loan amount -2.978*** -9.953*** -9.470*** -9.470*** -9.357*** 
 [-4.113] [-9.184] [-8.300] [-8.300] [-8.369] 
Maturity 0.082 0.998*** 0.958*** 0.958*** 0.968*** 
 [0.920] [3.826] [4.243] [4.243] [4.257] 
Collateral 17.373*** -15.204*** -16.947*** -16.947*** -16.832*** 
 [15.012] [-3.477] [-3.556] [-3.556] [-3.710] 
Number of lenders 2.127* -1.528 -2.081** -2.081** -1.929** 
 [1.977] [-1.196] [-2.535] [-2.535] [-2.105] 
Performance provisions -20.152*** -20.678*** -20.999*** -20.999*** -20.260*** 
 [-13.123] [-6.176] [-6.574] [-6.574] [-6.744] 
Number of covenants -1.948 1.875 1.209 1.209 0.941 
 [-1.565] [0.630] [0.364] [0.364] [0.271] 
Number of participants -2.638** 0.779 1.344 1.344 1.176 
 [-2.486] [0.556] [1.506] [1.506] [1.202] 
Bank asset volatility 8.352*** 1.070 -0.025 -0.025 -0.830 
 [15.475] [0.876] [-0.008] [-0.008] [-0.317] 
RBC ratio 6.829*** -1.598 -1.562** -1.562** -1.504* 
 [3.887] [-1.493] [-2.139] [-2.139] [-1.905] 
Bank size -0.655*** -0.442 -0.455 -0.455 -0.462 
 [-3.416] [-1.121] [-1.302] [-1.302] [-1.304] 
Bank ROA -0.756*** -1.069*** -1.042*** -1.042*** -1.049*** 
 [-11.888] [-6.715] [-6.450] [-6.450] [-6.315] 
Bank NPLs 0.603*** 1.518*** 1.406*** 1.406*** 1.385*** 
 [3.234] [4.040] [4.447] [4.447] [4.393] 
Firm size -88.902***     
 [-37.425]     
Firm ROA -2.598***     
 [-10.295]     
Firm Tobin’s Q -115.197***     
 [-8.441]     
GDP growth -0.034*** -0.001    
 [-3.133] [-0.041]    
GDP per capita 0.000 -0.005    
 [0.138] [-0.993]    
Stock market capitalization 0.059 -0.107    
 [0.799] [-0.397]    
Interbank rate 5.912* 0.921    
 [1.891] [0.389]    
Constant 1,439.699*** 431.464*** 426.248*** 426.248*** 425.478*** 
 [12.767] [12.562] [23.017] [23.017] [21.661] 
Observations 51,929 37,189 42,812 42,812 42,812 
Adj. R-squared 0.858 0.778 0.789 0.789 0.789 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y N N N N 
Quarter effects N N N N Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y N N N N 
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Firm × year effects N Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y N N Y 
Lender’s country × year effects N N Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects N N Y N N 
Borrower’s country × year effects N N N Y Y 
Country-pair effects N N Y Y Y 
Number of banks 289 267 364 364 364 
Number of firms 11,228 8,782 10,230 10,230 10,230 
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Table 6. Portfolio risk differences (RWA-based). Baseline results with different fixed effects 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined 
in Table 1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. Each specification 
includes a different set of fixed effects, as given in the penultimate part of the table. The lower part of the table denotes 
the number of unique lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In all 
specifications, Portfolio risk differences refers to the RWA-based Portfolio risk differences. The *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Portfolio risk differences -79.583*** -38.529* -47.966** -47.966** -42.930*** 
 [-13.544] [-1.873] [-2.276] [-2.276] [-2.922] 
Loan amount -2.822*** -9.954*** -9.479*** -9.479*** -9.365*** 
 [-3.184] [-9.185] [-8.331] [-8.331] [-8.403] 
Maturity 0.084 0.997*** 0.958*** 0.958*** 0.967*** 
 [0.882] [3.825] [4.246] [4.246] [4.259] 
Collateral 17.306*** -15.225*** -17.060*** -17.060*** -16.948*** 
 [15.024] [-3.478] [-3.566] [-3.566] [-3.724] 
Number of lenders 2.558* -1.517 -2.101** -2.101** -1.948** 
 [1.853] [-1.178] [-2.585] [-2.585] [-2.145] 
Performance provisions -20.571*** -20.711*** -21.044*** -21.044*** -20.292*** 
 [-13.773] [-6.202] [-6.583] [-6.583] [-6.756] 
Number of covenants -2.126* 1.854 1.116 1.116 0.850 
 [-1.772] [0.620] [0.334] [0.334] [0.243] 
Number of participants -3.089** 0.769 1.366 1.366 1.198 
 [-2.223] [0.546] [1.549] [1.549] [1.236] 
Bank asset volatility 9.628*** 0.858 -0.704 -0.704 -1.481 
 [23.370] [0.674] [-0.208] [-0.208] [-0.517] 
RWA ratio -1.479*** 0.272 0.873*** 0.873*** 0.859*** 
 [-7.621] [1.110] [3.949] [3.949] [3.354] 
Bank size -0.682*** -0.441 -0.451 -0.451 -0.458 
 [-4.000] [-1.117] [-1.284] [-1.284] [-1.289] 
Bank ROA -0.769*** -1.068*** -1.043*** -1.043*** -1.051*** 
 [-13.399] [-6.699] [-6.479] [-6.479] [-6.338] 
Bank NPLs 0.640*** 1.517*** 1.405*** 1.405*** 1.384*** 
 [3.528] [4.038] [4.445] [4.445] [4.392] 
Firm size -89.011***     
 [-38.577]     
Firm ROA -2.582***     
 [-9.817]     
Firm Tobin’s Q -115.663***     
 [-9.874]     
GDP growth -0.011 -0.004    
 [-1.100] [-0.132]    
GDP per capita -0.004 -0.005    
 [-1.624] [-0.919]    
Stock market capitalization -0.020 -0.102    
 [-0.191] [-0.378]    
Interbank rate 6.417* 0.677    
 [1.812] [0.276]    
Constant 1,608.902*** 417.557*** 361.055*** 361.055*** 361.643*** 
 [17.254] [10.558] [19.959] [19.959] [15.862] 
Observations 51,929 37,189 42,812 42,812 42,812 
Adj. R-squared 0.858 0.778 0.789 0.789 0.790 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y N N N N 
Quarter effects N N N N Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y N N N N 
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Firm × year effects N Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y N N Y 
Lender’s country × year effects N N Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects N N Y N N 
Borrower’s country × year effects N N N Y Y 
Country-pair effects N N Y Y Y 
Number of banks 289 267 364 364 364 
Number of firms 11,228 8,782 10,230 10,230 10,230 
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Table 7. Distinguishing between positive and negative portfolio risk differences 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is AISD and all 
variables are defined in Table 1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by 
lender’s country and bank. Each specification includes a different set of fixed effects, as given in the 
penultimate part of the table. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique lenders 
(Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In specification 
(1), the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences is interacted with Positive risk differences, i.e., a binary 
variable equal to one for values of the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences above our sample mean, 
and zero otherwise. In specification (2), we replicate the estimation in specification (1) by replacing 
the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences with the RWA-based Portfolio risk differences. The *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
Portfolio risk differences 74.645 22.733 
 [1.040] [0.652] 
Portfolio risk differences × Positive risk differences -29.446*** -14.005* 
 [-3.042] [-2.005] 
Positive risk differences -133.006*** -84.613** 
 [-3.528] [-2.599] 
Loan amount -9.475*** -9.487*** 
 [-8.197] [-8.236] 
Maturity 0.946*** 0.945*** 
 [4.275] [4.280] 
Collateral -15.546*** -15.652*** 
 [-3.313] [-3.315] 
Number of lenders -1.219 -1.235 
 [-1.555] [-1.586] 
Performance provisions -20.704*** -20.812*** 
 [-6.702] [-6.702] 
Number of covenants 1.911 1.815 
 [0.638] [0.597] 
Number of participants 0.447 0.467 
 [0.491] [0.517] 
Bank asset volatility -0.255 -0.277 
 [-0.066] [-0.068] 
RBC ratio -0.177  
 [-0.157]  
RWA ratio  1.000** 
  [2.206] 
Bank size -0.452 -0.450 
 [-1.276] [-1.266] 
Bank ROA -1.040*** -1.041*** 
 [-6.567] [-6.599] 
Bank NPLs 1.409*** 1.408*** 
 [4.459] [4.451] 
Constant 440.308*** 368.542*** 
 [18.256] [11.445] 
Observations 42,857 42,857 
Adj. R-squared 0.788 0.788 
Loan type Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y 
Number of banks 364 364 
Number of firms 10,230 10,230 
45 
 
Table 8. Portfolio risk differences vs. credit ratings disagreement 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is AISD and all 
variables are defined in Table 1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by 
bank. Each specification includes a combination of the market-regulatory differences measures and 
the credit ratings differences measure. Each specification includes a different set of fixed effects, as 
given in the penultimate part of the table. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique 
lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In 
specification (1), the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences is included alongside Split rating, i.e., a 
binary variable equal to one if the bank’s credit rating assigned by S&P is different than the credit 
rating assigned by Moody’s (and zero otherwise), and alongside Bank rating, i.e., the bank’s 
numerical credit rating assigned by S&P which assumes values from 1 (corresponding to AAA 
rating) to 22 (corresponding to D/SD rating). In specification (2), we replicate the estimation in 
specification (1) by replacing the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences with the RWA-based 
Portfolio risk differences. Each estimation is conducted for a subsample of loans granted from U.S. 
lenders. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
Portfolio risk differences -101.622*** -95.715*** 
 [-4.178] [-4.678] 
Split rating 4.197 4.040 
 [1.012] [0.980] 
Bank rating -0.706* -0.690* 
 [-1.760] [-1.730] 
Loan amount -6.793** -6.813** 
 [-2.290] [-2.302] 
Maturity 1.004** 1.003** 
 [2.520] [2.523] 
Collateral -12.636 -12.651 
 [-0.730] [-0.728] 
Number of lenders 0.645 0.579 
 [0.467] [0.405] 
Performance provisions -21.072*** -21.326*** 
 [-4.070] [-4.128] 
Number of covenants 4.169 3.635 
 [0.517] [0.435] 
Number of participants -2.306 -2.245 
 [-1.570] [-1.469] 
Bank asset volatility 14.993 27.561 
 [0.538] [1.195] 
RBC ratio -4.412  
 [-1.172]  
RWA ratio  2.111 
  [1.496] 
Bank size -0.228 -0.225 
 [-0.526] [-0.519] 
Bank ROA -1.334** -1.326** 
 [-2.373] [-2.345] 
Bank NPLs 1.979*** 1.972*** 
 [3.016] [3.005] 
Constant 187.773 -152.014 
 [0.528] [-0.574] 
Observations 18,788 18,788 
Adj. R-squared 0.733 0.733 
Loan type Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y 
Number of banks 291 291 
Number of firms 5,285 5,285 
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Table 9. Portfolio risk differences and bank characteristics 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 
1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. Each specification includes a 
different set of fixed effects, as given in the penultimate part of the table. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique 
lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In specification (1), the RBC-based 
Portfolio risk differences is interacted with Bank ROA, i.e., the return on total bank assets. In specification (2), the RBC-based 
Portfolio risk differences is interacted with Bank NPLs, i.e., the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. In specification (3), 
the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences is interacted with Bank category downgrade, i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a 
downgrade in the bank’s risk-weighting category, and zero otherwise. In specifications (4)-(6), we replicate the estimations in 
specifications (1)-(3) by replacing the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences with the RWA-based Portfolio risk differences. The 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Portfolio risk differences -58.820*** -60.384*** -63.483*** -45.827*** -47.076*** -47.840*** 
 [-2.727] [-2.840] [-3.779] [-2.819] [-2.885] [-2.852] 
Portfolio risk differences × 
Bank ROA 
2.626***   2.534***   
[4.219]   [4.325]   
Portfolio risk differences × 
Bank NPLs 
 -4.415***   -4.360***  
 [-4.276]   [-4.361]  
Portfolio risk differences × 
Bank category downgrade 
  -64.660*   -56.897* 
  [-1.866]   [-1.867] 
Observations 42,857 42,857 36,557 42,857 42,857 36,557 
Adj. R-squared 0.788 0.788 0.779 0.788 0.788 0.779 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 364 364 159 364 364 159 
Number of firms 10,230 10,230 8,750 10,230 10,230 8,750 
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Table 10. Lending relationships 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 
1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. Each specification includes a 
different set of fixed effects, as given in the penultimate part of the table. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique 
lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In specification (1), we interact the 
RBC-based Portfolio risk differences with Relationship lending, i.e., a binary variable equal to 1 for a prior lending relationship 
between the lender and the borrower during the previous 5-year period, and zero otherwise. In specification (2), we interact the 
RBC-based Portfolio risk differences with Relationship lending number, i.e., the ratio of the number of prior loans between the 
lender and the borrower during the previous 5-year period to the total number of loans received by the borrower during the same 
period. In specification (3), we interact the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences with Relationship lending amount, i.e., the ratio 
of the amount of prior loans between the lender and the borrower during the previous 5-year period to the total amount of loans 
received by the borrower during the same period. In specifications (4)-(6), we replicate the estimations in specifications (1)-(3) 
by replacing the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences with the RWA-based Portfolio risk differences. The *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Portfolio risk differences -64.629*** -56.338** -56.484*** -52.201*** -42.863*** -42.274*** 
 [-2.873] [-2.625] [-2.771] [-2.969] [-2.691] [-2.863] 
Portfolio risk differences × 
Relationship lending 
23.888**   25.126***   
[2.687]   [2.786]   
Portfolio risk differences × 
Relationship lending number 
 39.802***   40.282***  
 [3.125]   [3.152]  
Portfolio risk differences × 
Relationship lending amount 
  31.237**   31.944** 
  [2.025]   [2.035] 
Observations 42,857 42,857 42,714 42,857 42,857 42,714 
Adj. R-squared 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.788 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 364 364 364 364 364 364 
Number of firms 10,230 10,230 10,213 10,230 10,230 10,213 
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Table 11. Probability for break in relationship lending 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is Break in relationship lending and all variables are defined in Table 1. The estimation method is OLS with 
standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. Each specification includes a different set of fixed effects, as given in the penultimate part of the table. The lower part of the table 
denotes the number of unique lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In specification (1), we include the main term of the RBC-based 
Portfolio risk differences. In specification (2), the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences is interacted with Maturity, i.e., the loan duration (in months). In specification (3), the RBC-based 
Portfolio risk differences is interacted with Upfront fee, i.e., the one-time fee paid by the borrower to lender(s) at the loan closing date as a percentage of the loan facility amount. In specification 
(4), the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences is interacted with Firm ROA 75th, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the firm’s return on assets (Firm ROA) is in the top 25th percentile of our 
sample, and zero otherwise. In specification (5), the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences is interacted with Firm Tobin’s Q 75th, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the firm’s Tobin’s Q 
(Firm Tobin’s Q) is in the top 25th percentile of our sample, and zero otherwise. In specifications (6)-(10), we replicate the estimations in specifications (1)-(5) by replacing the RBC-based 
Portfolio risk differences with the RWA-based Portfolio risk differences. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Portfolio risk differences 0.121*** 0.118*** 0.310** 0.127*** 0.107*** 0.132*** 0.125*** 0.310** 0.130*** 0.116*** 
 [3.250] [3.399] [2.493] [3.676] [3.202] [3.776] [3.567] [2.490] [3.574] [3.476] 
Portfolio risk differences × 
Maturity 
 -0.001*     -0.001*    
 [-1.690]     [-1.684]    
Portfolio risk differences ×   0.060***     0.050**   
Upfront fee   [2.950]     [2.587]   
Portfolio risk differences ×    0.019*     0.020*  
Firm ROA 75th    [1.684]     [1.681]  
Portfolio risk differences ×     0.025**     0.026** 
Firm Tobin’s Q 75th     [2.158]     [2.168] 
Observations 42,857 42,857 4,394 42,791 42,855 42,857 42,857 4,394 42,791 42,855 
Adj. R-squared 0.930 0.930 0.979 0.929 0.928 0.930 0.930 0.979 0.929 0.928 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 364 364 148 362 364 364 364 148 362 364 









The first section includes additional summary statistics. The second section reports (i) estimates 
from the regression for the construction of our market-regulatory portfolio risk differences 
measure, (ii) estimates from our baseline regressions with different assumptions about standard 
error-clustering, (iii) results from specifications with alternative portfolio risk differences 
measures, (iv) weighted regressions, (v) estimates from the Heckman regressions, and (vi) 
results from MLE estimations. 
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Table A1. Number of loans and mean and standard deviation of Portfolio risk differences by lender’s country 
The table reports the number of observations (loan facilities), and the mean and standard deviation of Portfolio risk differences 
by lender’s country. 
Country Obs. 
Mean of 
Portfolio risk differences 
Std. Dev. Of 
Portfolio risk differences 
Australia 943 -0.11 0.14 
Austria 31 -0.25 0.08 
Belgium 53 -0.23 0.10 
Brazil 2 0.39 0.00 
Canada 3,165 -0.25 0.07 
China 208 -0.24 0.14 
Czech Republic 4 0.44 0.09 
Denmark 44 -0.35 0.10 
Finland 7 -0.21 0.04 
France 2,536 -0.29 0.07 
Germany 2,832 -0.36 0.06 
Greece 26 0.21 0.41 
Hong Kong 345 -0.08 0.21 
India 167 -0.10 0.19 
Indonesia 2 2.12 0.00 
Ireland 7 -0.46 0.08 
Italy 281 -0.10 0.18 
Japan 539 -0.29 0.08 
Macau 5 -0.28 0.02 
Malaysia 47 -0.12 0.16 
Mexico 14 -0.13 0.09 
Netherlands 410 -0.25 0.06 
New Zealand 4 0.45 0.00 
Norway 221 -0.24 0.10 
Philippines 2 0.59 0.00 
Poland 12 1.07 0.66 
Portugal 6 -0.09 0.05 
Russia 18 -0.34 0.09 
Saudi Arabia 19 0.64 0.48 
Singapore 147 -0.12 0.23 
South Africa 2 -0.17 0.00 
South Korea 25 -0.30 0.19 
Spain 804 -0.15 0.17 
Sweden 107 -0.33 0.10 
Switzerland 2,571 -0.41 0.09 
Taiwan 855 -0.22 0.11 
Thailand 11 -0.04 0.08 
Turkey 8 -0.11 0.23 
United Arab Emirates 4 -0.35 0.00 
United Kingdom 3,484 -0.21 0.18 
United States of America 22,889 -0.11 0.20 
Total 42,857     
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Table A2. OLS of Bank asset volatility on RBC ratio and RWA ratio 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) from the regression of Bank asset volatility on RBC ratio and 
on RWA ratio at the bank-year level. In specifications (1) and (2), Bank asset volatility is regressed on RBC ratio. In 
specifications (3) and (4), Bank asset volatility is regressed on RWA ratio. In specifications (1) and (3), the estimation 
method is OLS with constant. In specifications (2) and (4), the estimation method is OLS without constant. The *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
RBC ratio 0.027*** 0.032***   
 -5.897 -18.336   
RWA ratio   5.293*** 5.519*** 
   [12.955] [42.749] 
Constant 0.083  0.147  
 -1.185  [0.584]  
Observations 2,221 2,221 2,221 2,221 
Adj. R-squared 0.015 0.131 0.094 0.532 
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Table A3. Different loan controls 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 
1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. Each specification includes a 
different set of fixed effects, as given in the penultimate part of the table. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique 
lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. Different specifications include different 
loan controls to show that the estimates on the variable Portfolio risk differences are not overly sensitive to the loan controls used. 
In specifications (1)-(3), Portfolio risk differences refers to the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences. In specifications (4)-(6), 
Portfolio risk differences refers to the RWA-based Portfolio risk differences. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Portfolio risk differences -52.372*** -54.014** -50.232* -42.756** -44.740* -40.587* 
 [-2.754] [-2.229] [-2.005] [-1.971] [-1.809] [-1.794] 
Loan amount -10.115***   -10.126***   
 [-8.704]   [-8.742]   
Maturity 0.942***   0.941***   
 [4.262]   [4.266]   
Collateral  -16.290***   -16.490***  
  [-3.810]   [-3.841]  
Number of lenders  -1.054***   -1.053***  
  [-4.446]   [-4.471]  
Performance provisions   -23.060***   -23.149*** 
   [-7.353]   [-7.311] 
Number of covenants   0.489   0.358 
   [0.153]   [0.110] 
Number of participants   -0.933***   -0.929*** 
   [-3.603]   [-3.627] 
Bank asset volatility -0.410 0.066 -0.289 -1.203 -0.750 -1.121 
 [-0.108] [0.019] [-0.091] [-0.281] [-0.194] [-0.317] 
RBC ratio -1.743** -1.786** -1.856***    
 [-2.151] [-2.479] [-3.095]    
RWA ratio    0.972** 1.112** 1.121** 
    [2.192] [2.173] [2.156] 
Bank size -0.486 -0.568* -0.563* -0.481 -0.562* -0.557* 
 [-1.400] [-1.813] [-1.791] [-1.379] [-1.787] [-1.766] 
Bank ROA -1.054*** -1.065*** -1.040*** -1.056*** -1.068*** -1.042*** 
 [-6.833] [-5.793] [-5.698] [-6.881] [-5.848] [-5.750] 
Bank NPLs 1.415*** 1.455*** 1.473*** 1.414*** 1.454*** 1.472*** 
 [4.438] [4.321] [4.344] [4.429] [4.312] [4.335] 
Constant 422.606*** 308.182*** 301.522*** 349.777*** 227.012*** 218.883*** 
 [17.848] [15.387] [16.275] [11.858] [12.150] [11.886] 
Observations 42,857 42,857 42,857 42,857 42,857 42,857 
Adj. R-squared 0.787 0.781 0.781 0.787 0.781 0.781 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 364 364 364 364 364 364 
Number of firms 10,230 10,230 10,230 10,230 10,230 10,230 
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Table A4. Seemingly unrelated regressions 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. The dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 
1. The estimation method is FGLS. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique lenders (Number of banks) and 
borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. Different specifications include a system of regression equations to 
control for the simultaneous determination of loan terms in each loan facility (only the estimates from the regression where the 
dependent variable is AISD are reported). In each regression, the set of regressors is the same as in the regression for AISD 
(including AISD and excluding the variable that acts as regressand in the respective equation). In specification (1), three regression 
equations are estimated, where the dependent variable is AISD, Bank asset volatility, and RBC ratio respectively. In specification 
(2), five regression equations are estimated, where the dependent variable is AISD, Loan amount, Maturity, Collateral, and 
Number of lenders respectively. In specification (3), seven regression equations are estimated, where the dependent variable is 
AISD, Loan amount, Maturity, Collateral, Number of lenders, Bank asset volatility, and RBC ratio respectively. In specifications 
(1)-(3), Portfolio risk differences refers to the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences. In specifications (4)-(6), we replicate the 
estimations in specifications (1)-(3) by replacing the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences with the RWA-based Portfolio risk 
differences and RBC ratio with RWA ratio in all regression equations. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Portfolio risk differences -147.188*** -115.273*** -140.589*** -303.451*** -213.395*** -316.337*** 
 [-23.577] [-18.310] [-22.525] [-53.040] [-37.055] [-55.295] 
Loan amount -12.173*** -18.767*** -19.722*** -10.516*** -16.619*** -17.187*** 
 [-22.149] [-34.324] [-36.075] [-19.045] [-30.230] [-31.262] 
Maturity 0.226*** 0.006 0.071*** 0.181*** -0.069*** 0.001 
 [9.791] [0.268] [3.079] [7.739] [-2.975] [0.033] 
Collateral 98.764*** 172.860*** 173.184*** 94.205*** 170.414*** 167.465*** 
 [60.776] [110.534] [110.741] [56.982] [106.808] [104.965] 
Number of lenders -4.633*** -6.248*** -6.487*** -4.535*** -5.895*** -6.131*** 
 [-18.668] [-25.281] [-26.252] [-18.028] [-23.528] [-24.472] 
Performance provisions -55.213*** -47.752*** -47.388*** -54.032*** -48.465*** -47.316*** 
 [-21.549] [-18.639] [-18.497] [-20.917] [-18.763] [-18.318] 
Number of covenants -5.329*** -14.246*** -14.233*** -4.433*** -13.870*** -13.296*** 
 [-6.392] [-17.118] [-17.102] [-5.269] [-16.513] [-15.830] 
Number of participants 1.680*** 4.316*** 4.834*** 1.003*** 3.471*** 3.791*** 
 [6.001] [15.461] [17.319] [3.554] [12.339] [13.475] 
Bank asset volatility 24.672*** 16.395*** 24.807*** 44.796*** 23.778*** 45.072*** 
 [43.612] [28.642] [43.853] [86.989] [45.198] [87.524] 
RBC ratio 15.384*** 10.871*** 16.175***    
 [47.752] [33.313] [50.208]    
RWA ratio    -1.022*** -0.236*** -0.788*** 
    [-22.087] [-5.105] [-17.047] 
Bank size -1.227** -1.178** -1.131** -1.093** -1.140** -1.011** 
 [-2.507] [-2.406] [-2.310] [-2.216] [-2.311] [-2.050] 
Bank ROA -4.375*** -4.139*** -3.932*** -4.544*** -4.344*** -4.147*** 
 [-12.700] [-12.013] [-11.414] [-13.090] [-12.514] [-11.946] 
Bank NPLs 4.296*** 3.912*** 3.759*** 4.317*** 4.019*** 3.825*** 
 [13.311] [12.119] [11.647] [13.273] [12.357] [11.761] 
Constant 178.781*** 366.622*** 280.541*** 348.768*** 463.679*** 430.875*** 
 [15.131] [31.113] [23.820] [28.878] [38.480] [35.775] 
Observations 42,857 42,857 42,857 42,857 42,857 42,857 
R-squared 0.218 0.187 0.170 0.188 0.177 0.147 
Number of banks 364 364 364 364 364 364 





Table A5. Different clustering of standard errors 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 
1. The estimation method is OLS. The penultimate part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification 
and the type of standard error clustering (LC&Y refers to Lender’s country and Year, B&Y refers to Bank and Year, LC&B&Y 
refers to Lender’s country and Bank and Year). The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique lenders (Number of 
banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In specifications (1)-(3), Portfolio risk differences refers to 
the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences. In specifications (4)-(6), we replicate the estimations in specifications (1)-(3) by 
replacing the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences with the RWA-based Portfolio risk differences.  The *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Portfolio risk differences -58.074** -58.074* -58.074** -45.406* -45.406* -45.406* 
 [-2.841] [-2.122] [-2.841] [-1.893] [-1.893] [-1.893] 
Loan amount -9.485*** -9.485*** -9.485*** -9.495*** -9.495*** -9.495*** 
 [-9.962] [-7.757] [-9.962] [-10.871] [-8.263] [-10.871] 
Maturity 0.946*** 0.946*** 0.946*** 0.945*** 0.945*** 0.945*** 
 [5.233] [6.841] [5.233] [5.335] [6.852] [5.335] 
Collateral -15.487*** -15.487** -15.487*** -15.644*** -15.644** -15.644*** 
 [-3.253] [-2.912] [-3.253] [-3.252] [-2.955] [-3.252] 
Number of lenders -1.218 -1.218 -1.218 -1.244 -1.244 -1.244 
 [-1.352] [-1.222] [-1.352] [-1.453] [-1.224] [-1.453] 
Performance provisions -20.742*** -20.742*** -20.742*** -20.820*** -20.820*** -20.820*** 
 [-4.856] [-4.548] [-4.856] [-5.284] [-4.604] [-5.284] 
Number of covenants 1.934 1.934 1.934 1.807 1.807 1.807 
 [0.681] [0.714] [0.681] [0.648] [0.661] [0.648] 
Number of participants 0.452 0.452 0.452 0.483 0.483 0.483 
 [0.443] [0.399] [0.443] [0.501] [0.421] [0.501] 
Bank asset volatility 0.143 0.143 0.143 -0.847 -0.847 -0.847 
 [0.049] [0.066] [0.049] [-0.303] [-0.378] [-0.303] 
RBC ratio -2.228** -2.228** -2.228**    
 [-2.359] [-2.468] [-2.359]    
RWA ratio    1.128** 1.128* 1.128** 
    [2.322] [2.100] [2.322] 
Bank size -0.454 -0.454 -0.454 -0.447 -0.447 -0.447 
 [-1.215] [-1.381] [-1.215] [-1.225] [-1.404] [-1.225] 
Bank ROA -1.039*** -1.039*** -1.039*** -1.042*** -1.042*** -1.042*** 
 [-6.116] [-4.755] [-6.116] [-5.362] [-4.643] [-5.362] 
Bank NPLs 1.409*** 1.409** 1.409*** 1.407*** 1.407*** 1.407*** 
 [3.878] [2.968] [3.878] [4.891] [6.742] [4.891] 
Constant 432.111*** 432.111*** 432.111*** 345.316*** 345.316*** 345.316*** 
 [72.704] [24.105] [72.704] [12.696] [8.701] [12.696] 
Observations 42,857 42,857 42,857 42,857 42,857 42,857 
Adj. R-squared 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.788 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Clustering LC&Y B&Y LC&B&Y LC&Y B&Y LC&B&Y 
Number of banks 364 364 364 364 364 364 
Number of firms 10,230 10,230 10,230 10,230 10,230 10,230 
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Table A6. Different Portfolio risk differences measures 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 1. 
The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. Each specification includes a different 
set of fixed effects, as given in the penultimate part of the table. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique lenders 
(Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. Each specification includes a variation of Portfolio 
risk differences. Portfolio risk differences (EMU-adjusted) is the measure calculated when a common risk-free rate for all countries 
of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is employed in Equation (4). Portfolio risk differences (OLS w/o constant) is the 
measure calculated when the OLS in Equation (2) is estimated without a constant. Portfolio risk differences (OLS by bank) is the 
measure calculated when the OLS in Equation (2) is estimated for each lender separately. In specifications (1)-(3), Portfolio risk 
differences refers to the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences. In specifications (4)-(6), we replicate the estimations in specifications 
(1)-(3) by replacing the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences with the RWA-based Portfolio risk differences. The *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Portfolio risk differences (EMU-adjusted) -58.072***   -47.624*   
 [-2.741]   [-1.926]   
Portfolio risk differences (w/o constant)  -46.157***   -37.859**  
  [-2.742]   [-2.027]  
Portfolio risk differences (OLS by bank)   -42.357***   -42.563*** 
   [-2.879]   [-2.803] 
Loan amount -9.485*** -9.485*** -9.484*** -9.495*** -9.495*** -9.495*** 
 [-8.213] [-8.213] [-8.214] [-8.252] [-8.252] [-8.250] 
Maturity 0.946*** 0.946*** 0.946*** 0.945*** 0.945*** 0.945*** 
 [4.277] [4.277] [4.277] [4.282] [4.282] [4.282] 
Collateral -15.487*** -15.487*** -15.490*** -15.644*** -15.644*** -15.650*** 
 [-3.307] [-3.307] [-3.309] [-3.324] [-3.324] [-3.326] 
Number of lenders -1.218 -1.218 -1.226 -1.244 -1.244 -1.255 
 [-1.534] [-1.534] [-1.546] [-1.592] [-1.592] [-1.606] 
Performance provisions -20.742*** -20.742*** -20.746*** -20.820*** -20.820*** -20.825*** 
 [-6.704] [-6.704] [-6.712] [-6.673] [-6.673] [-6.701] 
Number of covenants 1.934 1.934 1.931 1.810 1.810 1.814 
 [0.646] [0.646] [0.646] [0.594] [0.594] [0.596] 
Number of participants 0.452 0.452 0.460 0.482 0.482 0.492 
 [0.490] [0.490] [0.499] [0.533] [0.533] [0.543] 
Bank asset volatility 0.143 0.143 -0.110 -0.721 -0.719 -0.364 
 [0.041] [0.041] [-0.034] [-0.182] [-0.182] [-0.102] 
RBC ratio -2.229*** -2.228*** -1.635*    
 [-2.855] [-2.853] [-1.941]    
RWA ratio    1.119** 1.119** 1.144** 
    [2.461] [2.461] [2.586] 
Bank size -0.454 -0.454 -0.453 -0.447 -0.447 -0.448 
 [-1.281] [-1.281] [-1.279] [-1.257] [-1.257] [-1.260] 
Bank ROA -1.039*** -1.039*** -1.039*** -1.042*** -1.042*** -1.042*** 
 [-6.528] [-6.528] [-6.530] [-6.571] [-6.571] [-6.574] 
Bank NPLs 1.409*** 1.409*** 1.409*** 1.408*** 1.408*** 1.408*** 
 [4.459] [4.459] [4.460] [4.447] [4.447] [4.452] 
Constant 432.128*** 432.104*** 434.313*** 344.606*** 344.593*** 350.344*** 
 [18.369] [18.368] [18.629] [11.867] [11.867] [11.057] 
Observations 42,857 42,857 42,857 42,857 42,857 42,857 
Adj. R-squared 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.788 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 364 364 364 364 364 364 
Number of firms 10,230 10,230 10,230 10,230 10,230 10,230 
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Table A7. Weighted regressions 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 
1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. Each specification includes a 
different set of fixed effects, as given in the penultimate part of the table. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique 
lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In specification (1), we weight by the 
number of loans between the lender’s country and the borrower’s country to the total number of loans in our sample. In 
specification (2), we weight by the number of loans between the lender and the borrower’s country to the total number of loans 
in our sample. In specification (3), we weight by the number of loans between the lender and the borrower to the total number of 
loans in our sample. In specifications (1)-(3), Portfolio risk differences refers to the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences. In 
specifications (4)-(6), we replicate the estimations in specifications (1)-(3) by replacing the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences 
with the RWA-based Portfolio risk differences. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Portfolio risk differences -58.358*** -58.247*** -58.168*** -45.800* -45.371** -45.457** 
 [-2.782] [-2.780] [-2.711] [-1.862] [-1.936] [-1.899] 
Loan amount -9.488*** -9.489*** -9.485*** -9.499*** -9.499*** -9.496*** 
 [-8.230] [-8.223] [-8.212] [-8.270] [-8.262] [-8.252] 
Maturity 0.946*** 0.946*** 0.946*** 0.945*** 0.945*** 0.945*** 
 [4.278] [4.277] [4.277] [4.283] [4.282] [4.282] 
Collateral -15.535*** -15.595*** -15.525*** -15.695*** -15.746*** -15.683*** 
 [-3.318] [-3.313] [-3.294] [-3.337] [-3.330] [-3.311] 
Number of lenders -1.238 -1.234 -1.176 -1.264 -1.259 -1.202 
 [-1.561] [-1.565] [-1.523] [-1.621] [-1.624] [-1.585] 
Performance provisions -20.723*** -20.707*** -20.746*** -20.801*** -20.786*** -20.824*** 
 [-6.728] [-6.745] [-6.709] [-6.693] [-6.708] [-6.673] 
Number of covenants 1.919 1.904 1.888 1.792 1.779 1.761 
 [0.637] [0.633] [0.632] [0.585] [0.582] [0.580] 
Number of participants 0.473 0.465 0.408 0.505 0.495 0.438 
 [0.515] [0.508] [0.455] [0.560] [0.552] [0.500] 
Bank asset volatility 0.158 0.132 0.131 -0.828 -0.866 -0.861 
 [0.045] [0.038] [0.037] [-0.208] [-0.217] [-0.214] 
RBC ratio -2.217*** -2.250*** -2.235***    
 [-2.881] [-2.804] [-2.831]    
RWA ratio    1.132** 1.121** 1.129** 
    [2.497] [2.499] [2.500] 
Bank size -0.454 -0.453 -0.454 -0.447 -0.446 -0.447 
 [-1.283] [-1.283] [-1.275] [-1.258] [-1.257] [-1.250] 
Bank ROA -1.037*** -1.037*** -1.039*** -1.039*** -1.040*** -1.041*** 
 [-6.483] [-6.482] [-6.550] [-6.527] [-6.525] [-6.593] 
Bank NPLs 1.409*** 1.408*** 1.408*** 1.408*** 1.407*** 1.407*** 
 [4.452] [4.457] [4.456] [4.440] [4.444] [4.444] 
Constant 436.808*** 436.919*** 430.703*** 350.064*** 350.049*** 343.760*** 
 [19.389] [17.303] [18.693] [13.332] [12.653] [11.942] 
Observations 42,857 42,857 42,857 42,857 42,857 42,857 
Adj. R-squared 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.788 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 364 364 364 364 364 364 
Number of firms 10,230 10,230 10,230 10,230 10,230 10,230 
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Table A8. Heckman sample-selection model 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) from Heckman’s (1979) sample-selection model. The 
dependent variable is in the second line of each panel and all variables are defined in Table 1. The estimation method 
in Panel A is maximum likelihood and in Panel B it is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and 
bank. Specifications (1) and (2) of Panel A report the estimates from the first-stage probit model for the determinants 
of the firm’s loan-taking decision. The lower part of Panel A denotes the dummy variables used in each 
specification. Panel B reports the estimates of the second-stage OLS regression for the effect of Portfolio risk 
differences on loan spreads. Each of the specifications in Panel B includes the inverse Mills ratio (Lambda) from 
the corresponding specification in Panel A. The penultimate part of Panel B denotes the type of fixed effects used 
in each specification. The lower part of Panel B denotes the number of unique lenders (Number of banks) and 
borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In specifications (1) and (2) of Panel B, Portfolio risk 
differences refers to the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences. In specifications (3) and (4) of Panel B, we replicate 
the estimations in specifications (1) and (2) by replacing the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences with the RWA-
based Portfolio risk differences. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 













Loan amount -0.176*** -0.183*** -0.174*** -0.178*** 
 [-62.539] [-64.645] [-62.829] [-63.707] 
Maturity 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 [9.379] [6.634] [8.439] [6.561] 
Collateral 0.164*** 0.140*** 0.148*** 0.141*** 
 [20.288] [17.069] [18.275] [17.336] 
Number of lenders -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.082*** -0.080*** 
 [-75.632] [-75.151] [-76.523] [-74.259] 
Performance provisions -0.018 -0.018 -0.004 -0.008 
 [-1.548] [-1.543] [-0.332] [-0.690] 
Number of covenants -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.021*** -0.022*** 
 [-4.369] [-3.864] [-5.427] [-5.628] 
Number of participants 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.088*** 
 [75.346] [75.300] [75.881] [74.012] 
Bank asset volatility  -0.054***  -0.049*** 
  [-27.757]  [-23.754] 
RBC ratio -0.010*** -0.005***   
 [-6.733] [-3.129]   
RWA ratio   -0.002*** 0.000** 
   [-10.582] [2.402] 
Bank size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [-0.229] [-0.365] [-0.440] [-0.574] 
Bank ROA -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 [-3.018] [-3.214] [-2.832] [-3.080] 
Bank NPLs 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 [0.930] [1.150] [0.643] [0.909] 
Firm size -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.004* -0.006*** 
 [-2.774] [-3.379] [-1.791] [-2.698] 
Firm ROA -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 [-4.545] [-4.877] [-5.213] [-5.190] 
Firm Tobin’s Q 0.056*** 0.033* 0.078*** 0.050*** 
 [3.084] [1.817] [4.329] [2.776] 
Firm leverage 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 [10.651] [10.870] [8.648] [9.352] 
Constant -20.937*** -4.242** -30.224*** -19.725*** 
 [-10.100] [-1.991] [-16.729] [-10.611] 
Observations 179,590 175,947 184,612 180,891 
Loan type dummies Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose dummies Y Y Y Y 
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Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Firm dummies Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country dummies Y Y Y Y 
 
 












Portfolio risk differences -46.605** -62.553*** -64.811** -53.547** 
 [-2.161] [-3.258] [-2.540] [-2.503] 
Loan amount 301.767*** 307.592*** 270.388*** 309.525*** 
 [11.298] [11.941] [9.876] [11.405] 
Maturity -1.097*** -0.593*** -0.667*** -0.564*** 
 [-5.716] [-3.457] [-3.282] [-3.251] 
Collateral -314.537*** -263.549*** -258.198*** -274.842*** 
 [-10.547] [-10.906] [-9.266] [-10.451] 
Number of lenders 164.928*** 162.113*** 151.391*** 165.787*** 
 [11.573] [12.268] [10.324] [11.726] 
Performance provisions 13.539*** 12.753*** -12.477*** -3.824 
 [3.248] [3.177] [-4.306] [-1.242] 
Number of covenants 33.975*** 29.540*** 37.704*** 42.590*** 
 [8.797] [8.773] [7.663] [9.413] 
Number of participants -180.629*** -178.173*** -164.392*** -180.507*** 
 [-11.554] [-12.271] [-10.344] [-11.724] 
Bank asset volatility -0.709 104.065*** 1.354 97.770*** 
 [-0.192] [9.921] [0.385] [9.291] 
RBC ratio 16.055*** 4.501***   
 [9.432] [3.960]   
RWA ratio   7.247*** 2.920** 
   [4.989] [2.536] 
Bank size 0.433 0.959** 1.089** 1.857*** 
 [1.246] [2.557] [2.651] [4.207] 
Bank ROA 8.050*** 8.489*** 6.583*** 8.269*** 
 [9.742] [10.337] [8.372] [9.855] 
Bank NPLs -1.314*** -1.888*** -0.307 -1.269*** 
 [-4.009] [-5.422] [-1.013] [-4.029] 
Lambda -2,500.030*** -2,453.699*** -2,247.789*** -2,519.777*** 
 [-11.558] [-12.238] [-10.004] [-11.649] 
Constant -2,914.067*** -3,254.251*** -2,293.312*** -3,068.568*** 
 [-9.952] [-10.696] [-8.540] [-10.141] 
Observations 42,508 42,508 42,508 42,508 
Adj. R-squared 0.830 0.835 0.817 0.828 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 362 362 362 362 
Number of firms 10,171 10,171 10,171 10,171 
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Table A9. Probability for break in relationship lending (MLE estimations) 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is Break in relationship lending and all variables are defined in Table 1. The estimation method is MLE with 
robust standard errors. Each specification includes a different set of fixed effects, as given in the penultimate part of the table. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique lenders 
(Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In specification (1), we include the main term of the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences. In specification 
(2), the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences is interacted with maturity, i.e., the loan duration (in months). In specification (3), the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences is interacted with 
Upfront fee, i.e., the one-time fee paid by the borrower to lender(s) at the loan closing date as a percentage of the loan facility amount. In specification (4), the RBC-based Portfolio risk 
differences is interacted with Firm ROA 75th, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the firm’s return on assets (Firm ROA) is in the top 25th percentile of our sample, and zero otherwise. In 
specification (5), the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences is interacted with Firm Tobin’s Q 75th, i.e., if the firm’s Tobin’s Q (Firm Tobin’s Q) is in the top 25th percentile of our sample, and 
zero otherwise. In specifications (6)-(10), we replicate the estimations in specifications (1)-(5) by replacing the RBC-based Portfolio risk differences with the RWA-based Portfolio risk 
differences. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Portfolio risk differences 0.244*** 0.253*** 0.177* 0.229*** 0.261*** 0.241*** 0.267*** 0.269** 0.243*** 0.271*** 
 [4.879] [5.083] [1.659] [4.164] [4.757] [4.258] [4.710] [2.346] [3.956] [4.366] 
Portfolio risk differences × 
Maturity 
 -0.006***     -0.006***    
 [-4.644]     [-4.852]    
Portfolio risk differences ×   0.016*     0.016*   
Upfront fee   [1.673]     [1.879]   
Portfolio risk differences ×    0.090*     0.092*  
Firm ROA 75th    [1.681]     [1.756]  
Portfolio risk differences ×     0.110**     0.126* 
Firm Tobin’s Q 75th     [1.916]     [1.873] 
Observations 42,857 42,857 9,174 42,791 42,855 42,857 42,857 9,174 42,791 42,855 
Adj. R-squared 0.0246 0.0264 0.0171 0.0257 0.0260 0.0244 0.0264 0.0178 0.0256 0.0259 
Number of banks 364 364 233 362 364 364 364 233 362 364 
Number of firms 10,230 10,230 3,286 10,230 10,230 10,230 10,230 3,286 10,230 10,230 
 
